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Indoor Wireless Body Area Networks: from
Channel Modeling to Secret Key Extraction
by
Ruslan Dautov
Abstract
A group of wirelessly communicating sensors that are placed inside, on or
around a human body constitute a Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN).
Continuous monitoring of vital signs through WBANs have a potential to revolutionize current health care services by reducing the cost, improving accessibility, and facilitating medical diagnosis. However, sensitive nature of personal
health data requires WBANs to integrate appropriate security methods and
practices. As limited hardware resources make conventional security measures
inadequate in a WBAN context, this work is focused on alternative techniques
based on Wireless Physical Layer Security (WPLS). More specifically, we introduce a symbiosis of WPLS and Compressed Sensing to achieve security at
the time of sampling. We successfully show how the proposed framework can
be applied to electrocardiography data saving significant computational and
memory resources. In the scenario when a WBAN Access Point can make use
of diversity methods in the form of Switch-and-Stay Combining, we demonstrate that output Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and WPLS key extraction
rate are optimized at different switching thresholds. Thus, the highest key
rate may result in significant loss of output SNR. In addition, we also show
that the past WBAN off-body channel models are insufficient when the user
exhibits dynamic behavior. We propose a novel Rician based off-body channel
model that can naturally reflect body motion by randomizing Rician factor K
and considering small and large scale fading to be related. Another part of
our investigation provides implications of user’s dynamic behavior on shared
secret generation. In particular, we reveal that body shadowing causes negative correlation of the channel exposing legitimate participants to a security
threat. This threat is analyzed from a qualitative and quantitative perspective
of a practical secret key extraction algorithm.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1

Synopsis

An ever-increasing population [47] and rapid growth in chronic diseases [2, 10,
101] around the globe pose new challenges to our healthcare systems. Most
chronic diseases such as heart disease and diabetes require continuous monitoring and expensive treatment affecting the quality of life of millions of people.
Current healthcare practices would benefit from a technology that can keep
track of patients’ vital signs in real time, does not require special skills to
operate, and can be used outside of hospitals. Wireless Body Area Network
(WBAN) [73] is one of these technologies. It has the potential to revolutionize the conventional healthcare system making it more convenient, effective
and accessible to everyone. Importantly, WBAN technology promotes development of eHealth and telemedicine [21] where patients can receive care
through video-conferencing tools in remote locations with restricted access to
1
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traditional healthcare services.
However, introducing WBANs constitutes new challenges related to the
sensitive nature of medical devices and personal medical records. For example, access to medical history can potentially be used for various malicious
purposes. Out of all industry sectors in the United States, healthcare data
breach has been acknowledged to have the highest resolution cost averaging
at $408 per single record [85]. This takes the majority share in an estimated
loss of $7.91 million due to all data breaches in 2018 [85].
Being an integral part of healthcare requires WBANs to comply with the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [20] which ensures privacy and security of patients’ data. Thus WBAN design and employment must take HIPAA into consideration. However, consisting of miniature
sensors with limited processing, storage and power capabilities, WBANs are
not suitable for conventional data security mechanisms and demand investigation of more appropriate alternative methods.
Wireless Physical Layer Security (WPLS) is one of these alternative methods. It utilizes inherent properties of the wireless multipath propagation to
provide a secure communication channel or a source of common randomness
used for extracting a shared secret. In this work, we focus on the latter and
utilize WPLS techniques to establish a secret key between two legitimate participants. Such a key can later be used for any type of symmetric encryption,
e.g. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31], Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [24] or even a One-Time Pad (OTP) [86].
Thus, in this dissertation we explore how various aspects of Wireless Phys-
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ical Layer Security (WPLS) can be applied to WBANs. In the beginning, we
consider a WBAN scenario where user behavior is static. We first propose
and examine how a well known concept of Compressed Sensing (CS) can be
augmented with security by means of WPLS. More specifically, we suggest a
framework where a CS measurement matrix is generated by a Linear Feedback
Shift Register (LFSR) initiated by a WPLS algorithm. Such a fusion of CS
and WPLS allows not only sampling the data at subNyquist rate but also
simultaneously securing it. This approach eliminates the need for additional
security mechanisms and saves scarce computational and memory resources.
In addition, we also investigate the effect of switching threshold on secret key
extraction when an access point in WBAN employs Switch-And-Stay Combining (SSC). We demonstrated that there is a trade off between output SNR
and Secret Key Generation Rate (KGR). It means that in order to achieve the
highest SNR, the system will sacrifice KGR and vice versa.
We then consider a WBAN with dynamic user behavior. First, we show
that traditional off-body channel models can not adequately describe the channel in presence of a moving subject and propose a new model. The proposed
model extends the widely accepted Rician fading model to address the change
in average power through the Rician factor K. On top of that, K is treated
as a random variable whose distribution is defined by the expected physical
dynamics of the propagation environment. Second, we study how dynamic
user behavior gives rise to body shadowing phenomenon and causes negative
correlation of the channel. We analyze the effect of negative correlation on
practical secret key extraction methods in presence of a passive eavesdropper.
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We demonstrate that a carefully chosen position in the room by the attacker
may lead to significant portion of the secret being exposed.

1.2

Summary of Contributions

This dissertation considers various aspects of secure communications using
the physical layer in Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs). In particular,
originality of this work is as follows:
• Propose and evaluate the first framework of Wireless Physical Layer
Security (WPLS) to secure Compressed Sensing (CS).
• First application of the proposed WPLS+CS framework to WBANs.
• Provide investigation of the effect of switching threshold on secret key
generation rate in WBAN Switch-and-Stay Combining (SSC) systems.
• Pioneering investigation of the connection between small and large scale
fading in WBANs and development of the dynamic WBAN off-body
channel model.
• Provide quantitative investigation of the effect of negative correlation
caused by body shadowing on secret key extraction in WBANs.

1.3

Dissertation Structure

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces the
foundation of Wireless Body Area Networks and Wireless Physical Layer Secu-
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rity necessary to understand the current work. In addition, it also gives details
on technical characteristics and organization of the WBAN experimental platform used throughout our research. Chapter 3 presents our contribution under
the known Rician channel model assuming limited body movement. In particular, augmenting data compression with security and investigating the impact
of the switching threshold on security in Switch-and-Stay Combining are considered. Our contributions where body movement is not restricted are given in
chapter 3. In this chapter, the off-body dynamic channel model in WBAN is
proposed and further used to address specific security issues. Finally, chapter
5 concludes the dissertation and outlines directions of future research.

Chapter 2

Background
In this chapter, we provide the background required for this dissertation. We
present a groundwork on Wireless Body Area Networks, Wireless Physical
Layer Security and how they can complement each other to improve safety of
personal data.

2.1
2.1.1

Wireless Body Area Networks
Overview

Current advances in wireless communications, digital electronics and MicroElectro-Mechanical Systems (MEMS) have enabled the deployment of inexpensive, low-power miniature devices called sensor-nodes. Spatially-distributed
sensor-nodes with wireless capabilities are grouped to form a Wireless Sensor
Network (WSN) [77]. Single WSN may include multitude of same or different type of sensors in order to monitor various ambient conditions including
6
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pressure, temperature, humidity, object’s movement and speed. WSNs find
applications in several major domains such as military [37, 60], environmental
monitoring [57, 64] and home automation [16, 90]. When compared to conventional ad-hoc wireless networks, WSNs have some important distinguishing
features:
• Lack of specific infrastructure.
• Topology may change over time.
• Limited computation, memory and power resources.
• Depending on application, may consist of hundreds or thousands of
nodes.
Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) [104,106] is a special type of WSNs
where sensors are placed on, around or even implanted under the skin of a human body. While being similar to WSN in many ways, unique propagation
around the human body and mission critical applications make WBANs distinct. Most important peculiarities of WBANs are given below [19, 56], while
more detailed overview of distinct properties of WBANs when compared to
WSNs are reported in table 2.1:
• In most cases, the number of nodes in a WBAN does not exceed one
dozen. Thus, high deployment density of WSNs with corresponding
redundancy, is not available in WBANs where operation of every node
is critical.
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• WBANs exhibit constant data rates and low latency. In contrast to WSN
where sensors are mainly employed for event based monitoring, WBAN
nodes are involved in physiological sensing that requires information to
be sampled and delivered regularly.
• Nodes in WBANs are mobile as they are connected to the body and
therefore move along with it. On the other hand, WSNs nodes do not
normally change their location and are considered stationary.
• Wave propagation in WBANs occurs in or around a human body - a
lossy medium that exhibits unique properties such as surface waves and
body shadowing.
• Security mechanisms in WBANs are essential to protect confidential
medical data. In WSNs, security depends on the application.

Table 2.1: Overview of differences between WSNs and WBANs [56]
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Figure 2.1: Typical Wireless Body Area Network Infrastructure

WBANs interconnect various biomedical sensors placed on a human body
with infrastructure and are poised to revolutionize the way health care industry
is currently operating. Employing WBANs for physiological monitoring brings
many benefits to patients as well as healthcare providers. Compared to stateof-the-art monitoring systems which impair patients mobility due to use of
wired technologies restricted to a hospital room, miniature WBAN sensors
offer considerably less invasive and location independent services. Thus, health
care can be delivered not only in hospital facilities but also at homes and
offices reducing the cost and improving the quality of patients’ life. There
are countless of WBAN applications in the health care sector [74]. They are
successfully employed in cardiovascular diseases monitoring [11], detection of
allergic agents for asthma patients [23] and glucose level monitoring for people
with diabetes [108].
Organization of WBANs typically remains relatively simple. Example of a
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Figure 2.2: Block diagram of a WBAN sensor hardware

basic WBAN is depicted in Fig. 2.1. An ordinary WBAN consists of a number
of small sensors that gather data and a so-called Central Control Unit (CCU).
Other widely used names for a CCU are Access Point (AP), Hub and Gateway.
The AP node is needed to access an external server where data can be securely
stored and analyzed. Since the server can be located thousands of miles away,
it is likely that the AP is connected to other communication networks like
cellular networks, wireless local area networks or land-line telephone networks.
The hardware block diagram of a typical WBAN sensor is depicted in
Fig. 2.2. Any WBAN node has three main stages of operation: detecting the
physiologic signal, digitizing and processing it, and then sending the signal
wirelessly to the AP. As usually the signal gathered from a human body is
weak and noisy, it first gets amplified and filtered to increase its strength and
minimize noise. In order to store the signal and apply digital processing it then
goes through an Analog to Digital Conversion (ADC). The microcontroller
then prepares the signal to be sent over the RF interface. In addition, the
microcontroller is responsible for efficient power management so that battery
lasts for sufficient period of time defined by the application of interest.
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The IEEE Standard 802.15.6 for Medical WBANs

Significance of WBANs is supported by the IEEE organization that has recently approved an IEEE 802.15.6 standard for WBANs employed in medical
applications (MBAN) [1]. To avoid interference from popular technologies such
as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, Zigbee and others, Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) allocated a separate Industrial Scientific Medical (ISM) frequency band
of 2360-2400 MHz for WBANs used for medical purposes. Related standard
for medical implants has also been ratified by ETSI EN 301 559 [40] with European Commission assigning a dedicated 2483.5-2500 MHz bandwidth. The
IEEE 802.15.6 standard gives specification only for Medium Access Control
(MAC) and Physical (PHY) layers.
Three different PHYs supported by the standard are as follows. Narrowband (NB) PHY operates in a wide range of frequencies and supports a variety
of modulation techniques. Ultra Wideband (UWB) PHY operates in two frequency bands: low is centered at 3993.6 MHz and high is centered at 7987.2
MHz. Each band consists of 499.2 MHz channels. Human Body Communications (HBC) PHY also employs two 4 MHz frequency bands which are
centered at 16 MHz and 27 MHz.
IEEE 802.15.6 MAC layer divides channels into superframe structures with
each superframe bounded by a beacon period. The CCU decides the boundaries of the beacon and chooses allocation slots. There are three MAC modes
specified: 1) Beacon mode with beacon period superframe boundaries; 2) Nonbeacon mode with superframe boundaries; 3) Non-beacon mode without su-
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perframe boundaries.
Network layer in WBANs is not covered by the standard and is mostly
driven by the application itself. As a consequence, significant volume of past
work has been dedicated to efficient routing algorithms in WBANs [39].
The IEEE 802.15.6 standard provides specifications of three different security levels: 1) Unsecured Communication - provides no security and transmits
data in unsecured frames; 2) Authentication level is a medium level of security
and ensures only authenticity of the communicating nodes; and 3) Authentication and Encryption provides authentication of the participants and transmits
data using encrypted frames.

2.1.3

Security Consideration in WBANs

The health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [20] mandates that since WBANs collect patients personal health information, e.g.
their health records, certain care must take place to guard it. According to
HIPAA, health care providers must ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of an individual’s health records. Furthermore, they need to identify
possible threats and provide adequate protection against them. It is also of
utmost importance to secure the data while it is being transferred and stored.
This is especially crucial for life-critical WBAN applications like an automatic
insulin injection or heart beat control, since a minor malfunction may cause
irrecoverable damage to a patient’s health or even death. Thus, data security
and privacy are two essential aspects of a WBAN design.
As was highlighted earlier in section 2.1.1, sensor-nodes in WBANs are
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required to be compact, unobtrusive and energy efficient in order to achieve a
practical and wearable system that lasts for extended period of time. These
requirements impose stringent limitations on resources such as memory size,
computation and transmission capabilities. To ensure data security under such
rigorous constraints is not a trivial task, especially when taking into account
the broadcast nature of wireless transmission, which is prone to interception
and eavesdropping. Along with other challenges, the problem of security significantly affects the deployment of WBANs in health care.
Approaches for securing information generally rely on two security paradigms:

Public-key

Public-key cryptosystems uses different but mathematically linked

keys for encryption and decryption. It is computationally infeasible to derive
one key from the other. For example, the well known Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
(RSA) [81] algorithm is based on difficulty of factoring large integers. While
the algorithm provides excellent security strength, it was designed for systems
with abundant memory, computation, and energy resources and thus is not an
adequate solution for resource constrained communications such as WBANs.
Due to high computational overhead, public-key systems are not normally
employed in WBANs. However, there have been some research efforts in this
domain primarily based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) [58, 109].

Secret-key

In contradistinction, secret-key cryptosystems use the same key

for encryption and decryption. A prominent example is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [31]. The AES algorithm is less complex and more
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suitable for securing information in WBAN. However, secret-key cryptosystems require a key management scheme to securely agree on a key between
legitimate communicating parties. The IEEE 802.15.6 suggests to solve the
problem by employing the widely used Diffie-Hellman key agreement algorithm [35]. However, this solution comes at the recurring price of complexity
and resources. This is especially noticeable when they secret key needs to
be updated periodically. Being, more suitable for WBAN limited hardware
resources, secret-key systems have drawn significantly more attention when
compared to public key systems. One of the key research directions lie in
the secret key distribution using biometrics where a human body acts as a
source of common randomness required for key generation [13, 22, 66, 75, 98].
Nevertheless, biometric based systems are limited to the nodes implanted in
a human body or attached to its surface. Consequently, a different solution
needs to be found when a body sensor-node communicates with an off-body
device, e.g. AP.
In this work, we make use of the wireless channel as a source of common randomness between the communicating parties. This approach is more
generic in nature and does not have the limitations of the biometric systems
mentioned above. Such area of research is named Wireless Physical Layer
Security (WPLS) [62, 88] and is discussed in section 2.2.
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Wireless Physical Layer Security
Overview

WPLS is an independent area of research that takes its origin from the fundamental works of Shannon [86] and later Wyner [102] who introduced a wiretap
channel. Unlike traditional security systems described in 2.1.3, WPLS investigates perfect secrecy and corresponding bounds. There are two research
directions within WPLS.
First direction relies on the channel itself to secure information. According
to [86], communication channel is perfectly secure if:

H(M |X) = H(M ),

(2.1)

where H(M ) is the entropy of message M , H(M |X) is the entropy of the
message conditioned on eavesdropper observation. According to the Wyner’s
model consisting of two legitimate correspondents Alice and Bob, and an eavesdropper under the assumption of a Gaussian channel, the secrecy capacity Cs
is given by:
Cs = [log(1 + SN R) − log(1 + SN RE )],

(2.2)

where Cs ≥ 0, and SN R and SN RE are SNRs of a legitimate participant and
an eavesdropper, respectively. From (2.2) it follows that secure communication
is achievable if the quality of the legitimate channel is better than the quality
of the wiretap channel.
Second direction takes advantage of the properties of the wireless channel
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in order to extract a shared secret through public discussion and use it for
encryption/decryption purposes. This approach has been explored in [5, 68]
where Alice and Bob gather correlated observation YA and YB of a common
random source. It was shown that the secrecy capacity of the key under
unlimited public discussion is:

CK = I(YA ; YB ),

(2.3)

where I denotes mutual information. The Slepian-Wolf coding [30] is then
required to generate a uniformly distributed secret key. As was shown in
[55,100], the wireless channel itself can act as a source of common randomness.
This is primarily due to the multipath wave propagation (Fig. 2.3). As this
work is focused on indoor scenarios, we would always assume the presence of
rich scatters. Three important properties of the wireless channel make key
sharing possible:
• Reciprocity: The multipath properties of the wireless channel as gain,
delay, phase shift, and others at any point in time are identical on both
sides of the communication link.
• Decorrelation in time: Over time, the multipath components change
due to movement of the participants or objects in the environment. This
is the weakest point of many WPLS methods since the environment
cannot be controlled.
• Decorrelation in space: The characteristics of the wireless channel are
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Figure 2.3: Indoor multipath propagation

unique for the locations of the two communicating parties. An eavesdropper residing at a different location which is more than a wavelength
away from either of the participants, experiences a different wireless
channel since multipath components are added in a different way.
In practice, a shared secret key is usually extracted from Channel State Information (CSI) or Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) [87, 99].
It is important to note that in wireless communication where multipath is
absent, e.g. free space or anechoic chamber, WPLS methods are useless.

2.2.2

Wireless Physical Layer Security in WBANs

There have been limited research efforts on exploiting the wireless channel for
key extraction in WBANs [6, 7, 8, 46, 92]. In [46] the authors show the RSSI

CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND

18

based key generation rate in WBAN to be ≈ 4 bits/sec in the experimental
setup and ≈ 2 bits/sec according to theory. A better use of channel randomness is proposed in order to update the AES style secret key every minute.
Syed Taha Ali et al in [6,7,8] show that dynamic WBAN channel can be decomposed into two different components: fast and slow component. It is possible
to isolate these components through filtering and use them independently to
meet specific application requirements. The slow component yields lower key
generation rate compared to the fast component, while improving key agreement rate. This results is of particular importance for WBANs since it allows
for eliminating key reconciliation and privacy amplification stages of the key
generation process and therefore alleviate computation burden. Another notable work is presented by Tsouri et al in [92] where authors investigate the
feasibility of establishing a secure random key for WBAN nodes operating on
a human body. A low complexity algorithm for shared key extraction from
RSSI samples is proposed and analyzed. It is shown that generated secret
exhibits high randomness, perfect match between the legitimate participants
and poor match for the eavesdropper.
Current work is meant to augment the existing body of knowledge on secure
communication in WBANs by investigating new aspects of WBAN systems or
improving those already available.
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WBAN Experimental Platform

Throughout the dissertation we employ reliable and energy efficient experimental platform TelosB (figure 2.4) that was specifically designed considering
WBAN requirements: size, sensing capabilities, battery operation.

Figure 2.4: TelosB WBAN platform sensor-node

2.3.1

Hardware

Every WBAN sensor-node consists of the following main components 2.5:
• Texas Instruments (TI) MSP430 microcontroller
• Chipcon CC2420 RF transceiver
• 2xAA type batteries
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Figure 2.5: TelosB WBAN platform sensor-node block diagram

Microcontroller

The TI MSP430 is designed for ultra low power applica-

tion and appears in many existing WBAN platforms. It has a 16-Bit RISC
Architecture and operates at 16 MHz with 125 ns instruction cycle. It has
eight 12-bit A/D converters and two 12-bit D/A converters. There are 2 serial
interfaces for carrying out sensor integration. MSP430 has 10 KB of RAM and
48 KB of internal Flash memory. There are three power consumption modes:
− Active: 330 uA
− Standby Mode: 1.1 uA
− Off Mode (RAM Retention): 0.2 uA
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RF transceiver The Chipcon CC2420 is a 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant radio. Consequently, it bears programmable output power (set to 1 mW by
default), programmable frequency, hardware AES-128 encryption and digital
(RSSI). The effective data rate is 250 kb/s when using Digital Direct Sequence
Spread Spectrum (DSSS). Current consumption in receive mode varies from
8.5 to 17.4 mA depending on output power, while receive mode consumes 8.5
mA. There are also other low power modes available for development purposes.

2.3.2

Software

The software part of the TelosB platform consists of 2 types: firmware for MSP
430, and software for Windows. Former is based on celebrated TinyOS OS.
Latter collects data, renders figures in real-time, saves data into a file for further processing and analysis. It is important to mention that the platform uses
basic star topology with the AP being constantly connected to the computer
via USB port. The AP polls the sensor-nodes sequentially and can gather
≈35-40 packets for a single node, and ≈8-10 packets when 4 sensor-nodes are
used.

Chapter 3

WBAN with Static User
Behavior
In this chapter, we consider security aspects of WBAN communication under
the assumption of static user behavior described by the Rician channel model.
In the first half, we propose a framework where Compressed Sensing and Wireless Physical Layer Security are integrated into a single process to accomplish
security at the time of sampling the data. In the second half, we investigate
a trade-off between the secret key generation rate and output Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) by manipulating the switching threshold in the Switch-and-Stay
Combining (SSC) system.
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Figure 3.1: Simple Wireless Body Area Network in Electrocardiography (S sensor-node, AP - access point, Eve - eavesdropper).

3.1
3.1.1

Securing Compressed Sensing on Physical Layer
Introduction

In this section, we propose a lightweight encryption framework for augmenting Compressed Sensing (CS) [17,18,36] with Wireless Physical Layer Security
(WPLS). The framework allows incorporating security in addition to compression while sampling an analog signal using CS. Since there is no need for a
separate encryption algorithm, the proposed method imposes marginal overhead and offers all benefits of CS.
The ability of CS to ensure security received some attention in the past
[69,76,79]. It is based on using the measurement matrix as a symmetric key for
encryption and decryption. However, the problem of key distribution in these
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works is not addressed and remains unsettled. To avoid the need for resource
hungry key distribution (Diffie-Hellman for example) we propose to employ
WPLS along with Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). WPLS is an active
area of research [34, 59, 91, 96, 105]. In principle, it aims to extract a common
secret between legitimate communicating parties through public discussion
over the wireless channel by exploiting intrinsic randomness of the channel.
Among the variety of WPLS algorithms we focus on low complexity algorithms
where secret bits are retrieved from Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
values. RSSIs are available to use in all commercial transceivers from packets
going back and forth between communicating parties. See also works [96, 105]
for more examples on WPLS related algorithms, [91] for the limitation of key
extraction under a proximity attack and [59] for the intrinsic ability of wireless
fading channels to secure information.
A simple WBAN shown in Fig. 3.1 is considered. It consists of a single
sensor-node, an access point that resides either on or off the body, and an
eavesdropper listening to their conversation. Secret bits are extracted from
RSSI values of incoming packets. These bits are used as seeds to feed a LFSR
to generate an m-sequence. The output m-sequences are later reorganized to
form a CS sensing matrix by transmitter and receiver without coordination.
A preliminary investigation of the proposed method was provided in [34]. The
work considered transmission of synthetic binary data over a Rician fading
channel in the presence of eavesdropper performing a proximity attack. By
means of simulation and estimated Mutual Information (MI), it was revealed
that generated sensing matrices ensure high quality reconstruction and there-
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fore suitable for CS. It was also shown that the adversary is unable to recover
the original signal while being physically close to one of the legitimate participants.
In this section, we propose a secure CS framework applied in the context of WBANs. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
framework on real world ElectroCardioGram (ECG) recordings provided by
the MIT Arrhythmia Database [43] using simulations and an experimental
setup. To provide more extensive analysis of reconstruction quality we assess
widely used similarity metrics of Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Relative
Error (RE), and Similarity Coefficient (SC). In addition, we analyze relative
time complexity and security strength against basic attacks. Note that the
method of estimation of mutual information provided in [34] is different than
the method used in this contribution due to limited source data. To compensate for possible data undersampling, we employ a James-Stein estimator of
MI [48]. As in [34] we assume a passive eavesdropper capable of carrying out
a proximity attack to reduce spatial selectivity of the Rician fading channel.

3.1.2

Compressed Sensing

CS emerged from the pioneering works of Candes, Tao, and Donoho [17,18,36]
as a new signal processing paradigm. It allows for perfect or optimal reconstruction of the analog signal from fewer samples than it is suggested by the
Nyquist theorem. This means that compression can be achieved while sensing the analog signal. Reduced number of acquired samples is beneficial for
WBAN. It mitigates the requirements imposed on sensor storage and process-
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ing capabilities.
The signal is said to exhibit sparsity if its “information rate” is much
lower than its bandwidth. Sparsity simply reflects the inherent ability of the
signal to be compressed. Most physiological signals captured by WBANs have
been proved to have a domain with efficient representation. Thus, wavelets
are shown to be particularly useful in ECG applications [4]. Without loss of
generality we employ CS in discrete-time domain where the field has already
reached its maturity.
Considering canonical CS, the signal of interest x can be represented in
some domain Ψ comprised of orthogonal set of N × 1 vectors {ψi }N
i=1 : x =
PN
i=1 si ψi = ΨS. Here S is a N × 1 vector of coefficients. Thus, the signal x
is called k-sparse if its representation above has exactly k(k << N ) non-zero
coefficients si . Exact sparsity allows for perfect signal recovery but is rarely
achievable for natural signals. More realistic scenario is when the signal x
is compressible with only k large and N − k small coefficients. CS can cope
with this situation and provide optimal signal reconstruction with small and
bounded error.
The sampling procedure of real, finite-length, sparse N × 1 signal x in
canonical CS is given by:
y = Φx

(3.1)

where Φ is an M × N (M < N ) matrix called the measurement or sensing
matrix and y is a sensed signal of size M × 1. CS is capable of finding a
solution for problem (3.1) when the sensing matrix Φ satisfies the Restricted
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Isometry Property (RIP):
(1 − δk ) kxk22 ≤ kΦxk22 ≤ (1 + δk ) kxk22

(3.2)

for all k-sparse vectors x and some constant 0 < δk < 1.
Knowledge of the compressed measurements y and the sensing modality Φ
gives the original signal x in sparsifying domain Ψ after solving the optimization problem:

min = kŜk1 subject to y = ΦΨŜ

(3.3)

Ŝ

that finds vector Ŝ with the lowest L1 norm. Compared to sampling (3.1),
the reconstruction problem (3.3) is computationally intensive. However, this
fits perfectly into a typical WBAN setup based on star topology where simple
sensors communicate with a more powerful access point.
Compressed Sensing has found its use in the area of wireless body area
networks. In [12] authors present a variety of WBAN application that can
benefit from CS. They show that employing the CS theory in WBANs allows
for optimal solutions for achieving the networks with low sampling rate and low
power consumption. The reduction of 25% and 35% is achieved for sampling
rate and power consumption respectively in case of ECG signal. Work in
[65] focuses on embedded ECG compression and explore the ability of CS
to compete with the state-of-the-art digital wavelet transform. The CS based
ECG system was shown to extend node lifetime by 37.1% compared to wavelet
based system. Simple CS encoder device embedded in sensor nodes of a WBAN
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is proposed in [78]. Both digital and analog models of CS encoder/decoder
are presented. The simulation results reveal that the proposed encoder is able
to compressively measure an electrocardiogram and an electroencephalogram
signals with compression ratios of 6:1 and 4:1, respectively. This allows for
82.9% and 75% of the energy consumption of transceivers. The experiment
results verified simulation and showed a compression ratio of 8:1 when applied
to ECG.

3.1.3

Proposed Encryption Framework

Secret Bits Distillation
The block objective is to extract a shared secret between a sensor-node and an
access point. For this purpose, we exploit the random nature and uniqueness
of the wireless channel between two legitimate communicating parties. There
are many WPLS algorithms that can be employed here. Thus, in simulation
we use a low complexity algorithm that follows [91] and performs the reciprocal
single bit quantization of RSSI values. In the experiment, due to correlation
of RSSIs in time, the algorithm from [92] is employed. Detailed description of
both is given in the corresponding paragraphs of section 3.1.4. The output is
a binary sequence of length m.

Linear Feedback Shift Register
The LFSR is a shift register whose input is a linear function of register’s
previous state. The m-stage LFSR takes a binary sequence of length m, called
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Figure 3.2: Block diagram of the proposed encryption framework

a seed, shifts it into adjacent positions producing a single output bit and
fills the empty position on the other end according to linear feedback. The
most commonly used feedback function is exclusive-or (XOR) of some bits
in the register. Example of 8-tap LFSR is given in Fig. 3.3. Due to finite
number of possible states the LFSR output sequence is also finite and after
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Figure 3.3: Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)

some point replicates itself. The carefully chosen linear feedback based on
primitive polynomial allows generating a so-called maximal length sequence or
m-sequence. m-sequence has the longest possible repeating cycle of 2m −1 and
features statistical properties that resemble a truly random binary sequence.
This fact is crucial for our purposes since we use LFSR for spreading the
distilled secret across a longer bit sequence. A set of m-sequences is used to
generate a sensing matrix Φ.

Sensing Matrix Generation
To balance the number of zeros and ones the input m-sequence is augmented
with additional zero. Then the elements of a new sequence {0,1} are mapped
to {-1,1} and reorganized to form a matrix. The process is repeated L times for
different m-sequences and results in a set of matrices Φ1 , Φ2 , ..., ΦL . Arithmetic
sum of Φi gives the sensing matrix as:

Φ=

L
X
i=1

Φi

(3.4)
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It follows that each entry of the sensing matrix converges to random variable
with Gaussian distribution as L increases by the central limit theorem. Note
that larger values of parameter L require more bits to be extracted from the
channel and thus L defines the amount of randomness in the system.
Another intuitive way to generate a sensing matrix is reported in [34] and
is described as follows:
Φ=

L
Y

Φi

(3.5)

i=1

which posses Bernoulli distribution. Even though, (3.5) produces a valid CS
sensing modality, entry wise matrix multiplication preserves the linearity property of LFSR resulting in reduction of key space to as much as a length of a
seed. Therefore, Bernoulli matrices generated according to (3.5) are excluded
from consideration.

Encryption and Decryption
This block is the only part of the framework that differs for transmitter and
receiver. Transmitter follows equation (3.1) and performs secure compressed
sampling of the original signal x with matrix Φ. The sensed version y is now
safe for transmitting to a receiver over an insecure broadcast channel. On the
other end, the receiver solves a convex optimization problem (3.3) in order to
recover the desired signal x.
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Figure 3.4: Block diagram of the performance evaluation framework

3.1.4

Evaluation Framework and Metrics

The evaluation framework consists of three parts which reflect different properties of the proposed encryption method. The first part describes the methodology of analyzing the quality of reconstruction. The second and third parts
address time complexity and security aspects respectively.

Quality of reconstruction
System Description

To evaluate the quality of reconstruction of the pro-

posed framework we perform simulation along with experimental study. Both
employ a wireless ECG scenario depicted in Fig. 3.4 where a sensor-node
communicates with an access point via wireless channel. The analysis also
includes an adversary party Eve who intercepts legitimate packets and tries
to decipher the information. Other than eavesdropping, we assume Eve is a
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passive adversary.
The communication is initialized by exchanging ordinary packets resulting
in RSSI values between the sensor-node and the access point. After sufficient
number of packets the sensor and the AP generate a CS measurement matrix
ΦAS according to the proposed method. The sensor-node applies secure CS
(3.1) to an ECG signal denoted as xS and transmits the result yS to the access
point. Having the matrix ΦAS and measurements yS , the access point solves
the optimization problem (3.3) and recovers the original ECG as x̂SA . Using
the proposed method, Eve aims to extract the sensing matrix ΦE similar to
ΦAS by performing a proximity attack on the access point. For convenience
and generality we normalize distance d between the AP and Eve by communication wavelength λ and use the normalized distance d/λ. The matrix ΦE
along with the intercepted signal yS allows Eve to run the same optimization
problem and reconstruct the original signal as x̂SE .
As was done in other ECG reconstruction work [52] we evaluate the quality
of reconstruction using SC, RE, RMSE. In addition, we estimate MI which
reflects security strength of the system and is therefore discussed under the
Security Strength subsection.

Simulation Setup In simulation, the wireless channel is modeled as a distancebased Rician fading channel implemented based on the model reported in [103]
following the setup in [92]. The Rician fading occurs when one of the multipath
components is stronger than the others which was shown to be an applicable
assumption in many practical applications including WBANs. It uses a single
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parameter called K factor to determine the strength of the dominant multipath component relative to the rest of the multipath components. We assume
no noise in the model and thus ΦAS is always equal for legitimate participants.
It is also assumed that simulated RSSI values are not correlated in time.
The WPLS algorithm in simulation setup is derived from [91] and works as
follows. Consecutive RSSI estimates are grouped into a sequence of length m.
After the m-th estimate is obtained, the average of the sequence is subtracted
from each element and the signs of the elements are then taken to form a
binary output seeding the LFSR. The process is repeated until the desired
number of sequences L is generated.
We conduct a set of simulation experiments applied to MIT Arrhythmia
database [43] using different combinations of K factors (K = 0, 1, 3, 10) and
normalized distances (d/λ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 1). The database is obtained from
47 subjects and contains 48 half-hour excerpts that were digitized at 360 samples per second per channel with 11-bit resolution over a 10 mV range. The
secure CS measurement matrix is generated once for each record. Thus, MI
and other metrics (RE, RMSE, SC) are also evaluated per ECG recording.
The size of the matrix is 128 × 256 which defines a compression ratio of 50%.
It also determines the LFSR seed length m = 15. The polynomial of our
choice is x15 + x14 + 1. Daubechies db10 lv4 transform is used as a sparsifying
basis Ψ [32]. The choice of the number of steps L in Sensing Matrix Generation block is a trade-off between system security strength and latency. In the
simulation, L is chosen to be 10. This gives 150 random bits extracted from
the channel which is sufficient to prevent a brute force attack. Reconstruction
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problem (3.3) is solved by the CVX package [44].

Experimental Setup

The experiment is of similar design as described

in [92] and includes extracting secret bits from the wireless channel. This
corresponds to a single Secret Bits Distillation block in Fig. 3.2. Extracted
bits are taken offline for generation of CS sensing matrices which are then
applied to the same MIT database as in simulation. For consistency, all applicable parameters from simulation retain their values for the experiment.
The experimental study complements our simulation and provides real-world
validation of our approach.
In the experiment, we use a TeloSB platform reported in chapter 2.3.
The test is performed while a test subject walks randomly around a typical
residential environment which includes a 20’x13.5’ living room, 15’x10’ and
18’x12’ bedrooms, a kitchen and a bathroom. The test subject is a 29 year
old man weighing 92.5 Kg and standing 1.86 meters tall. The experiment
considers key extraction in close proximity of a sensor-node, an AP and Eve.
The sensor-node is placed on the sternum of the test subject. The AP and Eve
are placed 8 inches to the right and to the left of the sensor-node respectively.
The test lasts for 10,000 message exchanges.
As opposed to simulation, consecutive RSSI estimates in the experiment
are correlated. To eliminate this problem, we employ a simple distillation
algorithm presented in [92]. For clarity and convenience we now briefly describe the algorithm. For every received packet, RSSI value is extracted and
the difference between the current and the previous values is calculated. The
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absolute sum of Q differences |S| is then compared to a predefined threshold
β. When the absolute sum exceeds the threshold, i.e. |S| > β, a secret bit is
generated by taking the sign of S. After multiple sets of Q differences, legitimate communicating parties exchange the indices of those sets who passed the
threshold. This facilitates the agreement process and allows excluding the bits
generated by only one of the parties. Note that it is very unlikely for Eve to
generate the same bit sequence due to different RSSI estimates. Following the
encryption block-diagram in Fig. 3.2, the generated binary sequence is used
to generate a CS sensing matrix that is applied to ECG database in the same
manner as was done in simulation. The values of Q and β are set to achieve
a reliable key extraction with appropriate statistical properties. From [92] it
follows that values of Q = 8 and β = 10 are suitable for our purposes since the
corresponding binary sequence is of sufficient length and passes all applicable
NIST randomness tests [83].

Complexity and Computing Cost
We analyze the complexity of the proposed encryption framework relative to
the reference framework. The proposed method is essentially the one given in
Fig. 3.2. In the heart of the reference method is the AES block that encrypts
data after compression with CS takes place. For consistency, proposed and
reference frameworks use the same WPLS algorithm for extracting the encryption/decryption key. In practice, decryption is done on a more powerful device
compared to a sensor-node and therefore only encryption process is analyzed.
In the analysis we use the following notations. SCS - number of samples
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being processed in a single step of CS, SAES - number of bits being processed
in a single step of AES, TCS and TAES - processing time of a single step
for CS and AES respectively, TW P LS - time required to generate a random
bit sequence of approximately 128 bits, TLF SR - time required to generate a
m-sequence using LFSR, TSM G - time required to generate a sensing matrix
having L m-sequences, α - CS compression ratio, q - number of bits per sample.
Thus, time Tprop to encrypt NB blocks of SCS samples each using the proposed model consists of extraction of a random sequence of bits (TW P LS ), generation of L m-sequences (L × TLF SR ), formation of a sensing matrix (TSM G )
and CS execution for each block (NB × TCS ):

Tprop = TW P LS + L × TLF SR + TSM G + NB × TCS

(3.6)

Time Tref to encrypt same NB blocks using the reference model consists of
key generation (TW P LS ), execution of CS for all NB blocks (NB × TCS ) and
execution of AES dSCS × q × α/SAES e times per each block:

SCS × q × α
+
TAES )
SAES


Tref = TW P LS + NB × (TCS

(3.7)

Relative time complexity of the proposed scheme can be expressed as a ratio
of (3.6) and (3.7). As the number of blocks to be encrypted increases, relative
complexity converges to:
Tprop
T
l CS m
=
×α×q
NB →∞ Tref
TCS + SCS
TAES
SAES

ρ = lim

(3.8)
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Security Strength
MI quantifies how much information x̂SE carries about xS , i.e. whether the
framework is secure in presence of an eavesdropper in close vicinity. More
specifically, we use a James-Stein (JS) shrinkage estimator of MI presented
in [48]. The estimator exhibits high computational efficiency and is reliable
in case of undersampled data. JS cell frequencies are estimated as Θ̂k =
L
λtk + (1 − λ)Θ̂M
k , where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the shrinkage intensity, tk is the shrinkL is the corresponding
age target distribution which is set to uniform, and Θ̂M
k

maximum likelihood frequencies. MI is found for both simulation and experimental setups the same way it was done for quality of reconstruction. For
estimation of MI, the reconstructed and original signals are quantized to 8
bits and scaled to have identical finite set of possible values. In addition to
evaluating MI between Eve and the sensor-node, we also evaluate MI between
the AP and the sensor-node to make sure reconstruction is successful.
In the rest of this section we present security strength of the proposed
framework when basic cryptographic attacks are applied. Since the order in
which the seeds are extracted is irrelevant for sensing matrix generation, the
complexity of the basic brute force attack is diminished by the number of
permutations of L and is given by 2m×L /L!. For L = 10 and m = 15 this
results in enormous computational efforts (2m×L /L! > 2128 ). However, Eve
can substantially reduce the complexity by exploiting proximity to a legitimate
receiver. For example, if Eve is close to the AP then their wireless channels
are highly correlated meaning that the random sequence she extracts is very
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similar to the one used in legitimate communication. In other words, distance
from the AP helps the attacker deduce how many bits need to be flipped in
order to get the correct key. If Eve knows that the corresponding distance
results in approximately h different bits then the complexity of this attack is

.
described as the number of combinations m×L
h
Initially, we find a minimum Hamming distance that makes combinatorial search impractical just as in the case of AES, i.e. of the same complexity as 2128 .

In the next step, we perform simulation experiments to

investigate the behavior of the Hamming distance between Eve’s and AP’s
distilled binary sequences for different combinations of normalized distances
(d/λ = 0.01, 0.02, ..., 2) and K factors (K = 0, 1, 3, 10). At each step, the
average Hamming distance over 1000 realizations is calculated. All other applicable parameters reported in section Simulation Setup remain the same.
Results help to reveal how far Eve needs to be in order to achieve the minimum required Hamming distance that was found previously.
Another security aspect that needs careful consideration is how sensitive
a measurement matrix is to small variations in an underlying binary sequence
and how it affects the quality of reconstruction. If two similar sequences result
in similar measurement matrices then it is not necessary for Eve to get the
exact key. This allows Eve to simplify the exhaustive search. To measure the
similarity between sensing matrices we use a relative perturbation metric
 = Φ − Φ0

2

/kΦk2 ,

(3.9)
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Table 3.1: Reconstruction of AP and Eve for different values of d/λ and K
d/λ

0.01

0.05

0.1

1

K
0
1
3
10
0
1
3
10
0
1
3
10
0
1
3
10

MI
mean
2.86(0.23)
2.86(0.31)
2.86(0.39)
2.86(0.32)
2.86(0.035)
2.86(0.038)
2.86(0.036)
2.86(0.036)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)
2.86(0.025)

variance
0.22(0.02)
0.24(0.16)
0.22(0.29)
0.23(0.26)
0.22(8.6E-4)
0.24(0.0011)
0.22(0.0016)
0.23(0.0012)
0.22(7.2E-4)
0.24(7.7E-4)
0.22(7.4E-4)
0.23(7.5E-4)
0.22(7.5E-4)
0.24(8.0E-4)
0.22(8.2E-4)
0.23(7.7E-4)

SC
mean
0.996(0.49)
0.996(0.53)
0.996(0.56)
0.996(0.51)
0.996(0.09)
0.996(0.10)
0.996(0.08)
0.996(0.09)
0.996(0.011)
0.996(0.010)
0.996(0.013)
0.996(0.014)
0.996(5.14E-06)
0.996(0.08E-2)
0.996(0.03E-2)
0.996(0.23E-2)

variance
9.94E-6(0.02)
1.15E-5(0.03)
1.04E-5(0.028)
1.11E-5(0.030)
9.94E-06(0.003)
1.15E-5(0.005)
1.04E-5(0.006)
1.11E-5(0.004)
9.94E-6(7.07E-4)
1.15E-5(5.57E-4)
1.04E-5(4.98E-4)
1.11E-5(0.0011)
9.94E-6(0.16E-3)
1.15E-5(0.16E-3)
1.04E-5(0.20E-3)
1.11E-5(9.9E-5)

RE
mean
0.090(1.03)
0.089(0.97)
0.089(0.93)
0.089(0.99)
0.090(1.48)
0.089(1.48)
0.089(1.50)
0.089(1.49)
0.090(1.57)
0.089(1.57)
0.089(1.57)
0.089(1.57)
0.090(1.58)
0.089(1.58)
0.089(1.57)
0.089(1.58)

variance
9.9E-4(0.04)
1.08E-3(0.066)
1.01E-3(0.064)
1.06E-3(0.065)
9.9E-4(0.004)
1.08E-3(0.006)
1.01E-3(0.008)
1.06E-3(0.005)
9.9E-4(1.2E-3)
1.08E-3(0.66E-3)
1.01E-3(0.67E-3)
1.06E-3(1.5E-3)
9.9E-4(1.6E-3)
1.08E-3(0.5E-3)
1.01E-3(0.37E-3)
1.06E-3(1.2E-3)

RMSE
mean
variance
5.24(66.06)
2.58(984.9)
5.20(62.68) 2.33(1217.3)
5.23(61.53) 2.63(1176.9)
5.24(65.24) 2.57(1266.2)
5.24(96.65) 2.58(1884.1)
5.20(96.06) 2.33(1784.1)
5.23(97.85) 2.63(1923.1)
5.24(96.85) 2.57(1853.6)
5.24(101.7) 2.58(1970.5)
5.20(101.6) 2.33(1923.7)
5.23(101.7
2.63(2050.3)
5.24(101.8) 2.57(2043.2)
5.24(102.5) 2.58(1934.8)
5.20(102.1) 2.33(1988.7)
5.23(102.2) 2.63(1997.5)
5.24(102.7) 2.57(2128.5)

where Φ and Φ0 are measurement matrices generated from original seed and
similar to it respectively.

Thorough theoretical analysis of effect of rela-

tive perturbation on the reconstruction process was provided in [51].

In

our simulation, for every combination of a Hamming distance from a set
[1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 13, 15] and a number of steps in sensing matrix generation L in
the range [1 − 50] the average  over 100 random is computed. All applicable
simulation parameters are identical to Simulation Setup.

3.1.5

Results and Discussion

Quality of Reconstruction
Simulation results are reported in Table 3.1. Each entry in the table is an
average value over 48 records. Corresponding results for an adversary are given
in parentheses next to values for legitimate participants (AP and sensor-node).
Similarity metrics of SC, RE, RMSE confirm that for all tested scenarios the
signal reconstructed by Eve on average cannot be used for practical purposes.
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Table 3.2: Reconstruction of AP and Eve for Q = 8 and β = 10
MI
SC
RE
RMSE

mean
2.86 (0.02)
0.996 (0.01)
0.089 (1.58)
5.2 (102.5)

variance
0.22 (7.27E-04)
1.12E-05 (3.04E-5)
0.0011 (6.0E-5)
2.5 (2011.2)

Reconstruction examples for Eve and the AP is presented in Fig. 3.7(b) and
Fig. 3.7(d) respectively. It is obvious that the signal recovered by Eve does
not resemble the original pulse. At the same time, the legitimate party meets
or exceeds commonly used benchmark values. Thus, SC has an average value
of 0.996 whereas the acceptable values is known to be greater than 0.9 [52].
Besides, SC exhibits extremely low variation which attests to the consistency
of the results. The same applies to RE and RMSE. Their average values and
variance also conform with Fig. 3.7 and exhibit almost perfect reconstruction
at the AP and completely unacceptable for Eve. The overall trend of the
table is as follows: as distance increases, Eve’s ability to reconstruct the data
is diminishing. Her mean values become farther and farther away from the
correct values while variance is getting smaller.
The experimental setup places Eve 8 inches away from the sensor-node.
Along with communication frequency of 2.4 GHz this gives an approximate
values of d/λ = 1.6. Experimental results are reported in Table 3.2. As in
Table 3.1, corresponding values for Eve are given in parentheses. It is seen that
the experimental results are almost identical to simulation and provide near
perfect average values with low variance of all metrics for AP. Eve experiences
extremely poor average and low variance without adequate reconstruction.
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Figure 3.5: Hamming distance for different combinations of d/λ and K

Similar experiment was done in the residential environment with the subject sitting down for L in the range of [1 − 20]. Results showed that the
proposed matrices behave similarly to pseudorandom gaussian matrices for all
tested L and give the same trend as reported in Table 3.2.

Complexity and Computing Cost
Relative time complexity showed in (3.8) implies that ρ < 1 meaning that
the complexity of the proposed encryption framework is always lower. For
example, using typical parameter values (SCS = 256 samples, α = 0.5, q = 11
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Figure 3.6: Relative perturbation for different number of flipped bits

bits, SAES = 128 bits) results in relative complexity

ρ = TCS /(TCS + 11 × TAES )

(3.10)

which gives a time advantage of not needing to process 11 AES blocks. On
a 64-bit core i7 machine with 8 Gb of RAM running Windows 7, Matlab
implementation of AES from [15] results in TAES ≈ 2 ms, whereas TCS ≈ 0.02
ms. This yields ρ ≈ 0.9 × 10−3 . Although Matlab would not be implemented
on a sensor-node, this number gives an idea of the difference in computing
costs.
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Figure 3.7: Example of reconstruction of a single pulse from record 100m for
different number of steps L in matrix generation process (K = 3, d/λ = 1)

Security Strength
Estimated MI is given in tables 3.1 and 3.2 for simulation and experimental
results respectively. In both cases, we observe the same trend as for other
similarity metrics. MI between the original signal and the signal reconstructed
by the AP is always high and has a value of 2.86 bits on average. At the same
time Eve’s reconstruction is poor. When d/λ is low ≈ 0.1 the wireless channel
does not provide sufficient spatial selectivity and there are cases when Eve is
able to extract the measurement matrix equal to the one extracted by the AP
or the sensor-node. This fact is reflected in higher average values and higher
variance of MI. The low variance of Eve’s as well as AP’s MI implies that Eve’s
reconstruction is consistently erroneous while the AP’s is stable and accurate.

Analyzing the number of combinations m×L
we conclude that the minih
mum Hamming distance hmin required to prevent combinatorial search is 45
bits assuming L = 10 and m = 15. Variation of the Hamming distance with
normalized distance and multiple K factors is presented in Fig. 3.5. Ripple
behavior is due to correlation properties of the Rician channel and is expected.
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If Eve is located farther than d/λ = 0.16 away from the AP then the system
is secure since the Hamming distance is always above hmin . Rician factor has
only marginal effect on security strength in the considered scenario.
Sensitivity of a sensing matrix in terms of relative perturbation is presented
in Fig. 3.6. As the number of steps used in sensing matrix generation increases
the relative perturbation decreases. This result is expected since for high L
smaller subset of its random bits gets affected. For fixed L > 1 relative
perturbation becomes stronger according to the number of flipped bits. Fig.
3.7(a-c) shows that even in the worst case scenario for Haming distance h = 1,
Eve cannot obtain proper reconstruction achievable for  < 0.05 [51].

3.1.6

Conclusion

In this section, we proposed a framework for securing wireless links in biomedical applications involving WBANs. The framework relies on using a CS measurement matrix as a symmetric key for encryption and decryption. The matrix is securely generated for both sensor-node and an access point using low
complexity WPLS algorithm. The encryption becomes an integral part of the
sampling process eliminating the need for a separate encryption algorithm and
substantially minimizing computational and memory requirements critical for
WBANs. The framework was evaluated in the presence of an eavesdropper
performing a proximity attack and applied to 48 ECG records of MIT Arrhythmia database. Both simulations and experiment methodologies that reflect a
wireless ECG monitoring scenario were employed for testing. Simulation assumed Rician fading channel and provided control on a normalized distance
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and Rician K-factor. Experiment extracted bits from the wireless channel and
included a sensor-node, an access point and Eve on the test subject’s body
where Eve was located 8 inches away from the sensor-node.
Various similarity metrics SC, RE, RMSE verified that while an AP achieves
accurate reconstruction with near optimal average values and low variance,
Eve’s reconstruction is extremely poor and useless for any practical purposes.
Using the mutual information and relative perturbation metrics, we showed
that the proposed framework generates strong keys and is resistant against
an eavesdropper located at a reasonable distance. Further security analysis
concluded that distances larger than d/λ = 0.16 from legitimate participants
is safe. This allows for practical consideration and gives a distance of 2 centimeters assuming 2.4 GHz communication frequency. Through relative time
complexity analysis it was shown that the proposed encryption framework is
much faster than its state-of-the-art competitor based on AES.

3.2

Improving Security of Switch-and-Stay Combining

3.2.1

Introduction

Intuitively, it is clear that WPLS can benefit from exploiting multiple antennas. Every antenna pair between Rx and Tx provides additional source of
common randomness and thus helps increase the Key Generation Rate (KGR).
Theoretical analysis and experimental investigation of Multiple Input Multiple
Output (MIMO) systems have been presented in [95], [97] and [107]. Though,
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Figure 3.8: System Model

MIMO communication is of great use to WPLS, its primary aims are to provide spatial diversity, increase channel capacity and provide spatial diversity
to reduce the effect of fading in the wireless transmission [41].
Due to increased complexity, cost or physical space limitation, implementation of multiple antennas at both Receiver (Rx) and Transmitter (Tx) may
not be possible. For instance, miniature mobile or static sensor-nodes are
usually equipped with one or at most two antennas. In this case, it is common to make use of resource efficient switched diversity (SD) methods that
include Selection Combining (SC), Switch-and-Stay Combining (SSC), Switchand-Examine Combining (SEC) and their variations. When compared to
celebrated Maximum Ratio Combining (MRC) and Equal Gain Combining
(EGC), SD does not provide optimal performance, but drastically simplifies
complexity of the receiver. Efficiency of SSC and SEC is defined by a switching
threshold that controls when switching to the next antenna occurs.
Switched diversity systems have been extensively studied and optimized
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for decoding performance [14], [3], and [84]. To the best of our knowledge,
employing SD techniques to improve KGR in WPLS has received no attention.
We are the first to address this gap and investigate a role of the switching
threshold in shared key generation under SSC. In this section, we show that
the criteria of maximum output SNR does not coincide with the highest key
rate and thus we target to find a trade-off between the two.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The next subsection 3.2.2
describes the system model under consideration with its analytical justification. Main numerical and simulation results along with discussion are presented in subsection 3.2.3. Conclusion is given in subsection 4.1.7.

3.2.2

System Model

In our framework, two legitimate communicating parties (Alice and Bob)
collaborate to establish a shared secret using the wireless channel. Bob is
equipped with two receiving antennas and capable of applying switched diversity. The framework under consideration is presented in Fig. 3.8. We
consider Rician slow fading wireless channel such that reciprocal estimations
of the channel gains, i.e. h1 , h01 and h2 , h02 , are highly correlated. Also, time
between consecutive channel estimations is greater than decorrelation time,
making adjacent channel gains independent. Communication between Alice
and Bob is assumed to be intercepted by the passive eavesdropper (Eve) located more than a few wavelengths away. Alice, Bob and Eve are assumed to
have access to noiseless public communication channel required for legitimate
participants to agree on the secret key. The less information Alice and Bob
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exchange publicly, the stronger their shared key is.
Legitimate participants employ half duplex communication where Alice
always initiates the exchange and Bob replies. Within the estimation time
Te Alice and Bob exchange training symbols S transmitted with power Pt .
Due to slow fading and prompt estimations, channel gains h1(2) and h01(2) are
correlated with correlation coefficient ρ and stay constant during Te . Note
that if the channel is changing at the same rate, estimation time fully defines
the correlation coefficient ρ. Bob’s received signals through his two antennas
are then
YB1 = h1 S + NB1

(3.11)

YB2 = h2 S + NB2

(3.12)

After diversity combining performed by Bob, Alice receives
YA = h01(2) S + NA

(3.13)

2 ) at Bob’s antenna 1
where NB1 ,NB2 , NA are Gaussian noise vectors ∼ N (0, σN

and antenna 2, and Alice’s single antenna respectively. The estimated channel
gain by Bob and Alice are

e
hB1 = h1 + nB1

(3.14)

e
hB2 = h2 + nB2

(3.15)
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(3.16)

where nB1 , nB2 , nA are Gaussian noise scalars ∼ N (0, 1/γt Te ) with transmit
2 . If we denote power of the estimated channel gain as P ,
SNR γt = Pt /σN
h

it is useful to introduce another notion of SNR with regard to channel gain
estimation as:

γh =

Ph
= Ph Te γt
σn2

(3.17)

We will denote Bob’s channel after SSC as e
hB . Given channel estimations
e
hA and e
hB performed by the legitimate nodes and by the eavesdropper e
hE ,
the upper bound on the key generation rate is defined by conditional mutual
information
RK =

1 e e e
1
I(hA , hB |hE ) = I(e
hA , e
hB )
Te
Te

(3.18)

where the last equality is due to the assumption that Eve is located sufficiently
far for her channel to be independent of Bob and Alice’s channel.
Bob’s operation is detailed in Fig.3.9. After Alice sends a request, it is
received on Bob’s antenna i. The channel gain hi is then estimated and SSC is
performed according to the following scheme. Assuming antenna 1 is currently
in use
e
hB =



e

hB1 , e
h2B1 ≥ θth

(3.19)



e
hB2 , e
h2B1 < θth
Same equation holds if antenna 2 is used by swapping the indices. If the
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Figure 3.9: Bob’s operation logic

channel gain e
h2B1 is greater than the predefined threshold θth , Bob replies using
antenna 1 and e
hB1 is used for key extraction. If e
h2B1 < θth , then Bob switches
to antenna 2. He performs channel estimation and replies to Alice through
antenna 2. In this case e
hB2 is used for key generation. Alice can use only
a single antenna and estimates the channel from Bob’s responses. Thus, the
correlated streams e
hA and e
hB are formed.

3.2.3

Simulation Setup, Results and Discussion

Our simulation makes use of 100 thousands independent realizations of the
Rician channel per Rician factor K = 0, 3, 5. Doppler frequency is 5 Hz which
corresponds to moderate movement in indoor scenarios. Channel estimation
time is chosen to be Te = 0.01 sec in order to keep the correlation relatively
high, i.e. above 0.9. Transmission SNR is γt = 20 dB. SNR with regard to
channel estimation is γh = 20 dB. Due to high correlation of reciprocal channel
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gains, accurate estimation of mutual information is performed using Kraskov
Stoegbauer Grassberger (KSG) estimator with local nonuniformity correction
described in [42]. Rician channel simulator is implemented according to [103].
The main results of the conducted simulation experiments are reported
in Figs.3.10-3.11. Fig.3.10 presents key generation rate as a function of the
switching threshold. For comparison, the same figure also presents the key
rate in case of no diversity corresponding to single antenna communication.
It is obvious that the rate changes with the threshold and has pronounced
low and high peaks. The low peak occurs around θth = 16 dB, while the
high peak appears at 23 dB, which is 3 dB above the average SNR γh . KGR
at its maximum point is 12%, 10%, and 7% higher compared to no diversity
communication for K = 0, 3, 5 respectively. Such a favorable result comes
from the fact that Alice and Bob are involved in asymmetric transmission
(at least for key generation part of transmission) with Alice always sending a
request and Bob replying to it. This creates imbalance in Bob’s and Alice’s
channels and gives Bob power to manipulate the correlation between reciprocal
estimations by adjusting the threshold.
As the threshold approaches negative or positive infinity, the key generation rate is getting closer to the rate achievable by single antenna. It is to
be expected since if θth is very low, the channel is almost always acceptable
and switching occurs rarely meaning that the same antenna is used almost all
the time. On the other hand, if θth is very high, Bob’s current antenna can
never satisfy the threshold and therefore he switches to a different antenna
all the time. Due to independence of consecutive channel estimations, this is
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Figure 3.10: Key generation rate for various switching thresholds θth

equivalent to using a single channel.
Another interesting fact is that the key rate and the Rician factor K are
inversely proportional. As K increases, KGR experiences reduction. This
is consistent with previously known results where amount of randomness in
the wireless channel facilitates extraction of the shared secret. Since K = 0
corresponds to the Rayleigh distribution which has no dominant multipath
component, it provides the highest entropy and the highest KGR.
Fig.3.11 shows system operating curves where KGR and output SNR are
on y and x axis respectively, keeping the switching threshold as a parameter.
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Figure 3.11: Key generation rate vs average output SNR

In other words, every point demonstrates achievable output SNR and KGR
for a specific fixed switching threshold. An ellipsoid like operating curve starts
and ends at approximately the same location (leftmost point) that corresponds
to single antenna performance. As the switching threshold increases, the KGR
is decreasing while average output SNR is increasing. After KGR drops to its
minimum (bottommost point), it also starts rising. The lower part of the
ellipsoid is formed until the output SNR reaches maximum (rightmost point).
After that KGR keeps increasing till its top (uppermost point), after which
both SNR and KGR diminish. This forms an upper part of the ellipsoid.
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It is important to note that the highest upper bound on key generation is
achievable at a different switching threshold than maximum average output
SNR. The optimal threshold for the latter is θth = γh = 20 dB, while key
rate peaks at around 23 dB for all considered Ks. Thus, optimizing the SSC
system for the fastest key generation rate and maximum output SNR encounters a trade-off problem as both objectives are unattainable at the same time.
Depending on the primary goal of the communication between legitimate participants, Bob can pick his operating condition. For example, if the highest
KGR is the main objective in the current stage, then for K = 0 Bob will set
the switching threshold to be θth = 21 dB sacrificing almost 0.4 dB of the
output SNR.

3.2.4

Conclusion

Switched diversity techniques such as SSC significantly simplify complexity
of the receiver and provide reasonable performance improvement in fading
conditions. In this section, we investigated how shared secret generation can
benefit from SSC by manipulating the switching threshold. In a typical scenario where only one of the legitimate participants can make use of diversity,
we showed that due to asymmetric request/response communication, changing
the threshold has a compelling impact on key extraction. Depending on the
Rician factor, the increase in KGR can be up to 12%. Moreover, we revealed
that optimizing SSC system for both average output SNR and key rate requires resolving a trade-off. From the considered simulation experiments, the
highest KGR comes at the expense of approximately 0.4 dB of output SNR.

Chapter 4

WBAN with Dynamic User
Behavior
In this chapter, we investigate the implications of dynamic user behavior on
the off-body channel in WBANs. In the beginning, we show that existing
channel models are insufficient in this scenario. We then propose a new model
that takes into account body motion and therefore allows for more accurate
description of the dynamic off-body channel. After that, we explore how body
motion gives rise to negative correlation and analyze the effect of the negatively
correlated passive eavesdropper on practical key extraction methods.
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Dynamic channel model
Introduction

There have been significant research efforts in characterizing, modeling and
simulating the off-body channel in WBANs [9,25,26,27,28,29,45,63,82,89,93].
In [27, 28] S.L. Cotton et al. considered multiple time-synchronized bodyworn
receivers operated at 868 MHz. The experiments were performed in anechoic
chamber, open office area and hallway. The cross-correlation of the off-body
channel between receivers was reported and used in analysis of diversity techniques under Nakagami fading. Experimental, simulation, and theoretical results were shown to be in good agreement. D. Smith et al. [89] provided statistical characterization of the static and dynamic off-body channel with respect
to commonly used distributions and found log-normal distribution to provide
the best fit. S. Han and S. Park [45] proposed to use an additional receive
antenna located on the opposite side of the body (back vs chest) to mitigate
body shadowing. They showed that this approach yields significant diversity
gains in the context of MIMO and diversity schemes. In [29] S. L. Cotton et al.
studied the effect of body shadowing in an anechoic chamber at 2.45 GHz and
concluded that additional terms to log-distance path loss model are required
to describe the communication channel when the subject’s body obstructs the
line of sight. M. Mackowiak and L. M. Correia [63] introduced an off-body
channel model where multi-path components are calculated according to a Geometrically Based Statistical Channel model. Multiple antenna placement as
well as running and walking scenarios were simulated in a street environment.
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R. Rosini et al. [82] presented a space-time varying off-body channel model at
2,45 GHz. Two different antennas were used to investigate the impact of polarization. The proposed model identified three components: path loss, body
shadowing and multipath fading. Off-body MIMO links are investigated by
P. V. Torre et al. [93] where channel model is comprised of Rayleigh multipath fading and log-normal body shadowing. The model was able to predict
BER and channel capacity from shadowing and fading correlation matrices
gathered in the experiment. S. L. Cotton [25] proposed a model that takes
into account potential clustering of multipath components. The body to body
communication link was considered in addition to the on/off body channel in
anechoic chamber and outdoor environment. Same author showed the benefits of the proposed model when fit to experimental data gathered in low
multipath conditions in [26]. S. J. Ambroziak et al. [9] proposed an off-body
channel model assuming indoor environment and taking into account antenna
placement, body orientation, body motion, and propagation conditions.
In this section, we propose an off-body channel model where, in contrary
to other work, small scale fading and large scale fading are considered to be
linked. Particularly, we assume that Rician fading completely determines instantaneous received power in a relatively confined propagation environment.
Futhermore, we consider Rician factor K as a random variable with its distribution defined by the motion dynamics of the scenario of interest. Results
show that the proposed approach can inherently address various types of body
motion and accurately predict probability density function (PDF) of instantaneous power at the receiver in many practical applications.
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Traditional Channel Models

Most traditional off-body channel models are based on traditional link budget
approach where instantaneous path loss LP T is comprised of three independent
components as presented in the following equation:

LP T = LP (d) + LB + LF

(4.1)

where LP (d) is the average path loss at distance d, LB is the loss caused
by body obstruction (body shadowing), LF is the loss due to destructive superposition of multipath propagation (multipath fading). Here, large scale
fading, that is comprised of average path loss and body shadowing, sets the
average power of the received signal P . Small scale fading is then formed
within the immediate environment of the receiver and considered with parameters independent of P . This description provides a good model for relatively
larger distances where path loss occurs due distance and large obstacles such
as buildings. Since all relevant multipath components while reaching the receiver experienced the same shadowing from buildings, small scale fading can
be seen as truly independent of path loss.
A good example of this approach is [26] where experimental data, gathered
under various scenarios, is used to find the best distribution fit for each aforementioned components separately. In general, experimental scenarios may
be defined by multiple factors such as presence of the line of sight, propagation/scattering environment, TX/RX antenna placement, body position and
body motion. Although adapting the model to different scenarios makes the
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model agree with experimental results with high accuracy, this approach has
its obvious drawbacks. It is difficult to draw a connection across various experimental setups and therefore establish how their parameters relate to each
other. Moreover, as we would demonstrate next, in dynamic scenarios, which
involve body motion, separation of loss terms in (4.1) does not occur limiting
analysis to relatively static cases.

4.1.3

Proposed Channel Model

Model definition
We consider the off-body channel in a relatively confined indoor propagation
environment, e.g. a single hospital room or a typical office space, and assume
that small scale fading follows Rician distribution:
x
f (x|ν, σ) = 2 exp
σ



−(x2 + ν 2 )
2σ 2


I0

 xν 
σ2

,

(4.2)

where ν 2 and σ 2 are power of the direct LoS/dominant multipath component
and the rest of multipath components respectively. I0 (.) is the modified Bessel
function of the first kind with order zero. Rician fading was previously shown
to provide a good fit for a wide range of experimental data [9, 70]. Under
these assumptions, the large scale fading followed by independent small scale
fading assumption does not fit the signal propagation behavior given by (4.1).
Instead, due to the strong attenuation of body shadowing and assuming limited
motion, we expect to be able to model the received signal using just small scale
Rician fading with the Rician factor defined as:
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(4.3)

that is due mainly to LoS providing a dominant component. When considering motion, the body shadowing becomes variable, and by that also the power
of the dominant component and K. It follows, that K could be modeled as
a random variable with a distribution that matches expected WBAN motion
and the dynamic nature of the propagation environment. All of this happens without an expected change in the power of all the remaining multipath
components. As a consequence, changing Rician factor also impacts average
received power PR . Thus it is plausible to couple K and PR in a Rician fading
model to describe the off-body channel in WBANs operating indoors. This
fact can also be supported by considering total power received from all paths:

PR = ν 2 + 2σ 2

(4.4)

Taking into account (4.3), it can be shown that:

PR = 2σ 2 (K + 1)

(4.5)

As the power of multipath components 2σ 2 is not expected to vary significantly
in a relatively confined indoor space, it is apparent that PR is proportional to
K. To account for a potential link between Rician factor and average received
power we introduce their correlation coefficient ρKP .
Formally, instantaneous path loss LP T and received power PR in the pro-

CHAPTER 4. WBAN WITH DYNAMIC USER BEHAVIOR

62

posed model can be defined by the following:

LP T = LP (K) + LF (K),

(4.6)

PR = PT − LP T (K),

(4.7)

where PT is transmitted power; LP and LF are power loss due to body shadowing and Rician fading respectively. All loss terms in (4.6) and (4.7) are
given in decibels (dB) while power terms are in dBm. Note that both average
power loss LP and multipath fading LF are driven by the Rician factor K.
Transmit and receive antenna gains are considered to be included in PR and
PR terms of (4.7). Based on the above, we refer to the proposed model as
KP or KP-X, where ’X’ is the distribution type used to represent the random
Rician factor.

The Single Input Single Output Channel
The proposed model is able to address different practical scenarios by randomizing K. The result is a Rician PDF with average power and K that
are correlated and vary over time. Body motion will have an impact on the
distribution of the Rician factor. For instance, in a static case, where the
subject’s position remains unchanged relative to the AP, it is likely to have
a narrow distribution of K around a single mean value. In another scenario,
where the subject walks around, K will have a wider range and probably a
more uniform-like distribution.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model in the literature that pro-
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Figure 4.1: Experimental room layout with sensor placement locations

vides flexibility in addressing multiple types of body motion when the physical
dynamics (reflected in Rician factor) of the experiment can be anticipated.
Having a single parameter in the form of K as a random variable that is directly related to the signal propagation scenario, gives a powerful predictive
tool, which is not achievable with curve fitting data to a PDF.

The Single Input Multiple Output Channel
Scenarios described above in 4.1.3-The Single Input Single Output Channel
imply single sensor-node and AP with no diversity schemes. The proposed
model can be easily extended to account for multiple receive or transmit antennas. For instance, receive diversity can be achieved when AP antennas are
distributed around the room. To account for presence of multiple antennas,
equations (4.6) and (4.7) are expanded to use a joint distribution of Ks instead
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of a univariate distribution:

fK1 K2 ...Kn (k1 , k2 , ..., kn ),

(4.8)

where n is the number of antennas.
For multiple antenna systems it is crucial to consider possible correlation
between the antennas. Correlation can be embedded in the proposed model
through correlated Rician factors in (4.8). It is important to note that correlation can be negative as well as positive. Negative correlation may occur due
to specific location of receiving antennas in the room, e.g. on opposite walls.
When one receive antenna experiences body shadowing, another is likely to
have clear LoS. Negative correlation has been observed by the WBANs researches (see references [93] and [94]), but its impact on channel models has
been largely overlooked.

4.1.4

Experimental Setup and Data Processing

We conduct a set of experiments accompanied by simulations. All experiments
are carried out in a typical rich indoor scattering environment with walls,
chairs, desks, computers and laboratory equipment. The layout of the room
is shown in Fig. 4.10. The human subject in our study is a 177 cm tall male
weighing 92 kg. All sensor-nodes, including the AP, use integrated on-board
antennas with minimum receive sensitivity of -90 dBm and mounted on walls
or the subject’s chest ≈1.5 meters above the floor, unless noted otherwise. We
use a TeloSB platform that includes a Chipcon CC2420 RF Transceiver and a
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Figure 4.2: TeloSB mote placement on a human subject

TI MSP430 microcontroller. The transceiver is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant and
operates in the 2.4 GHz ISM band using polling mechanism at a rate of about
35 packets/sec for a single node and 8-10 packets/sec when four nodes are
employed. It supports programmable output power set to 1 mW and digital
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI). The effective data rate is 250 kb/s
using a digital Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) baseband modem.
Position of the TeloSB’s sensor on a human body is presented in Fig. 4.2.
After gathering, data is taken offline for processing and analysis.
Data processing and analysis is done in Matlab. Main steps include resampling RSSI streams to a 1 ms resolution and aligning time origins if multiple
sensors are involved. Fitting distribution if performed with the help of fitdist
function that performs maximum likelihood parameter estimation. Rician fac-
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tor K is found from the parameters of best Rician distribution fit according
to (4.3). Pearson correlation coefficient [72] between K and average received
power PR is calculated as:
N

1 X
ρ(K, PR ) =
N −1
i=1



Ki − µK
σK



PRi − µPR

!

σPR

(4.9)

where µK ,σK and µPR ,σPR are mean and standard deviation of K and PR
respectively, and N is the number of samples.
We use two metrics to provide a quantitative measure for the goodness of
fit of the proposed KP model to the gathered experimental data. One or twosided Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test [67] is used depending on whether the
hypothesized distribution is known or generated by the model. In its core, the
KS test is based on the maximum distance between empirical and hypothesized
CDFs. We will refer to this value as KS score. Another metric used in this
section is correlation ρpdf between the experimental PDF and a candidate
PDF. The actual distribution of the experimental data or data generated by
the KP model, is approximated using ksdensity function. Correlation values
above 0.95 usually indicate a good fit and are considered acceptable.

4.1.5

Experiments and Modeling

Next, we provide a detailed description of several experimental studies and
extension of our model to multiple antenna systems. First three experiments
are meant to confirm the feasibility of the assumed K-PR relationship. The
other experiments reflect the most typical static and dynamic use cases such
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as reading at desk and casual walking scenarios. The use case where the subject is turning towards and away from the AP is also presented to show the
flexibility of the proposed model. Extension to multiple antenna reception
through Selection Combining (SC) is also considered. Finally, the last subsection describes how to generate the channel according to the proposed KP
model.

Assumption Validation
The first experiment is meant to show how the Rician factor changes with
distance. To accomplish that, the AP at location 1 (Fig. 4.10) communicates
with the sensor-node placed in front of it at d meters away. d ranges from 0.5
to 6.5 meters with an increment of 0.5m and measured along the horizontal
dimension of the room. For every distance, five independent measurements of
2000 RSSI samples are conducted where a human subject is casually walking
around the room at a pace of ≈1m/sec without obstructing the LoS between
two devices.
The second experiment is designed to understand the behavior of Rician K
with rotation of a human body while the sensor-node is placed on the subject’s
chest and the AP is at location 1 (Fig.4.10). Subject stands 2 meters away
in front of the AP and with the relative angle γ between them (γ = 0◦ being
clear LoS and γ = 180◦ being strong nLoS). For every γ from 0◦ to 315◦ with
a step of 45◦ , five measurements of 2000 RSSI samples are gathered. The
subject slightly moves hands to facilitate small scale fading.
In the third experiment, the AP is also placed at location 1 (Fig.4.10).
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The AP polls the sensor-node on the subject’s chest while he stands at multiple different locations and orientations around the room. Around 2000 RSSI
samples are collected for each position. As in the previous experiment, subject
promotes small scale fading with minor movements of hands. Given experiment captures both relations explored above (e.g. K vs distance, K vs body
angle) together to confirm the proposed connection between Rician factor and
average received power.

Reading at Desk
Reading at desk represents one of the most common static activities in the
indoor environment. The AP is placed at location 1 (Fig.4.10) while the
subject with the sensor-node on his chest is seating at a desk in front of it
and reading a book. Two measurements of 10,000 RSSI samples are taken.
First, when the subject is facing the AP, providing clear LoS. Second, when
the subject is facing the opposite wall, leading to nLoS. The main purpose of
this experiment is to test the proposed channel model in the traditional non
dynamic scenario.

Turning and Fixating
In this experiment, a single sensor-node is placed on the chest of a human
body while the AP is put next to the wall at location 1 (Fig. 4.10). The
subject stands in the middle of the room ≈ 4m away and turns 180◦ degrees
temporarily fixating in two positions: 1) clear LoS between the AP and the
sensor-node, and 2) LoS fully obstructed by the subject’s body, e.g. the subject
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is facing the wall opposite to the AP. Time between fixations is approximately
15 seconds. The experiment aims to evaluate whether our model can adapt
to a very specific practical scenario. Around 5000 RSSI samples are collected
during this experiment.

Casual Walking
During this experiment, the AP is located on the subject’s chest. There are
four sensor-nodes that are placed at different locations around the room depicted by red circles in Fig. 4.10. During data collection, the subject casually
walks around the room in a random fashion at a speed of ≈ 1 m/s causing
a Doppler spread of ≈ 5 Hz. Due to reciprocity of the wireless channel and
rapid sampling (8-10 Hz) within the coherence time, this setup is equivalent
to having four APs (RXs) and a single sensor-node (TX). On average 10,000
RSSI samples are collected for every RX in this experiment.

Selection Combining
To evaluate the potential and predictive quality of the KP model beyond distribution fitting, pure selection combining (SC) [71] scheme is applied on data
gathered in the casual walking experiment of section 4.1.5. It is assumed that
all RXs act as distributed antennas of a single receiver performing SC. As we
mentioned in section 4.1.3-The Single Input Multiple Output Channel, when
multiple receive antennas are involved it is important to understand how their
reception is correlated. Thus we find a channel correlation matrix Ω0 = ρ0ij ,
where ρ0ij is a correlation between instantaneous power of RXs i and j. Since
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we are interested in correlation of average power between multiple antennas
(same as correlation between Rician factors), low pass filter (LPF) is used to
separate average power from fading and find a corresponding correlation matrix Ω = ρij , where ρij is a correlation between average power levels. This is
required in order to understand on how SC performance is affected by correlation. Due to baseband nature of casual walking, LPF passband and stopband
frequencies are chosen to be 0.5 Hz and 1 Hz respectively. To insure balanced
diversity branches, average power of all RXs is matched before applying SC.
SC is performed on all possible RX pairs. Based on the output of the combiner
we find outage performance of the system for RXs i and j as follows:

ij
Pout

Z

Rth

= CDF (Rth ) =
0

fRij (r)dr

(4.10)

SC

where i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4; i 6= j; fRij (r) is PDF of SC output for nodes i, j; Rth
SC

is RSSI threshold. For a given outage probability Pout , relative SC gain for
receivers i, j as:

ρ

0
Gij = Rthij − Rth

(4.11)

ρ

0 and R ij are RSSI thresholds in dB that correspond to uncorrelated
where Rth
th

antennas and antennas having correlation ρij . When antennas i, j are uncorrelated, e.g. ρij = 0, the relative SC gain is Gij = 0 dB. In case of positive
correlation (ρij > 0) the gain is negative and can be perceived as what is
commonly termed as diversity loss. The relative gain is positive when ρij < 0.
Note that RSSI is nothing but Instantaneous Signal-to-Noise Ratio scaled by
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noise variance.
To evaluate how well the proposed KP model agrees with experiments described earlier, we conduct a set of corresponding simulation studies which
are meant to match the practical cases. Also, since every experiment is inherently limited in capturing channel parameters, the ability to address various
hypothetical use cases is of significant practical importance. From definition
it follows that the proposed model is described by the Rician factor K and a
specific relation connecting Rician factor and average received power through
a correlation coefficient ρKP . For simplicity, we assume that K and PR are
strongly correlated, i.e. ρKP = 1. If the corresponding average power PR
cannot be extracted from the experiment of interest, the relationship observed
in subsection Assumption Validation is used. In all our simulations, Rician
fading is generated using the model reported in [103] while also randomizing
K as explained before.

Modeling
Distribution of K is chosen according to the practical scenario in consideration. Thus, for the reading experiment from section 4.1.5, Rician factor is
most likely to be a single value or concentrated around a single value. For
the turning experiment in section 4.1.5, it is appropriate to expect that Rician
factor would have two distinct values, while for the walking experiment in
section 4.1.5, K will likely to have a range of values. Taking this into account,
we consider Rician factor to originate from a normal distribution denoted
2 ), or a uniform distribution denoted as KP-Uniform
as KP-Normal (µK , σK
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([Kmin Kmax ]). In addition, a normal mixture distribution KP-Normal Mix2 ; µ , σ 2 ) is considered for the turning experiment in section
ture (µK1 , σK
K2
K2
1

4.1.5. Best fit to experimental data is evaluated according to correlation ρpdf .
In order to investigate the effect of SC on the experiment in section 4.1.5
with multiple RXs, we first attempt to evaluate correlation of average received
power embedded in correlation of instantaneous received power. To find relative gain, SC is applied to the simulated channel exactly in the same way,
described in section 4.1.5, as for the experimental data. Correlation levels
between antennas ρij were set to values from -1 to 1 with increments of 0.2.

4.1.6

Results and Discussion

Assumption Validation
Results of the assumption validation experiments described in section 4.1.5
are reported in Figs. 4.3 - 4.5. Fig. 4.3 shows how K varies with distance
between TX and RX. On each box the central mark signifies the median, and
the bottom and top edges indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles, respectively.
The whiskers extend to the most extreme data values. The figure clearly
demonstrates that Rician factor is diminishing with distance regardless of the
presence of LoS. As was hypothesized earlier, this is likely due to power of
multipath components being relatively constant, while the power of the LoS
component reduces with TX-RX separation. This fact is also supported by
the obvious exponential behavior of the K = K(d) curve. The estimated
correlation of average K and distance d is ρKd ≈ 0.85.
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Figure 4.3: Rician K vs distance between TX and RX (ρKd ≈ 0.85)

Fig. 4.4 shows how Rician factor changes with body orientation, where 0◦ strong LoS and 180◦ - strong nLoS. From the figure it follows that K is strongly
correlated with orientation of the human body. Correlation of average K and
body orientation relative to the off-body AP γ is ρKγ ≈ 0.77. It is important
to note that this figure resembles a radiation pattern of an antenna placed on
a torso of a human body [9]. As the subject changes his orientation relative
to the AP, LoS component degrades due to average path loss, leading to lower
values of Rician factor K.
Finally, the presence of a linear relationship between Rician factor and
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Figure 4.4: Rician K vs body angle at 2m between TX-RX (ρKγ ≈ 0.77)

average received power expressed in dBm can be easily observed from Fig.
4.5 that shows results of the third experiment mentioned in section 4.1.5Assumption Validation. The correlation is ρKP ≈ 0.84 which validates the
main assumption behind the proposed model. With our simulation assumption
of ρKP = 1, K-PR relationship is defined with a straight line P = 0.7K − 60
which is also depicted in Fig. 4.5. Coefficient of determination and root mean
squared error of the linear fit are R2 = 0.75 and RM SE = 3.94, respectively.
Variation around the linear trend is due to stochastic nature of the wireless
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Figure 4.5: Rician K vs average received power PR (ρKP = 0.84)

channel. Since every position in this experiment can be seen as a comprised
effect of translation (change of distance Fig. 4.3) and rotation (change of body
orientation Fig. 4.4) the presence of strong correlation is to be expected.

Distribution Fitting
Results of distribution fit for the considered practical scenarios are visualized in
Fig. 4.6 with corresponding details reported in Table 4.1. Figs. 4.6a and 4.6b
illustrate the static reading experiment in case of LoS and nLoS, respectively.
When the subject is facing the opposite wall from the AP, the dominant LoS
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component is eliminated. Hence, the proposed KP model converges to a Rician
distribution with K ≈ 0 (Rayleigh). All considered distributions provide
a relatively good fit in this scenario with correlation coefficient above 0.99.
When the subject is facing the AP, the LoS component is present. This is
reflected in a higher average power of -52.6 dBm (compared to -70 dBm for
nLoS) and a more narrow distribution. In this case, the KP model converges to
a Rician distribution with single K = 3.28 resulting in the highest correlation
ρpdf = 0.95 and KS score of 0.068 as stated in Table 4.1. As expected, Rayleigh
distribution provides the lowest quality of fit with ρpdf = 0.80.
Fig. 4.6c shows the outcome of the turning experiment discussed in 4.1.5.
Values of K and PR extracted from the experiment and used in simulation
are K1 = 28.7, P1 = −45.2 dBm and K2 = 3.2, P2 = −59.9 dBm. Employing
these values in modeling using binomial and normal mixture distributions gives
PDFs that are in good agreement with the experiment. However, adjusting
the variance in case of normal mixture distribution gives another degree of
freedom and hence higher correlation ρpdf = 0.98 against ρpdf = 0.96. KS score
for both distributions are comparable. Note, that employing the traditional
approach according to [9] using (4.1) would require separation of LoS and
nLoS communication and treating these cases independently, e.g. having two
models to describe a single experiment. This creates a major inconvenience in
applicability of the traditional methods.
Fig. 4.6d shows a PDF fit for every RX in the walking experiment. From
the figure it follows that RSSI values at RXs 2,3,4 are distributed similarly
while RX 1 exhibits a different behavior. The reason for such a significant
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Figure 4.6: Visualization of distribution fit for various experimental scenarios

difference might be the presence of a desk in front of RX 1 (see Fig. 4.10)
that prevented getting too close to the sensor leading to prevalence of lower
RSSI samples. From Table 4.1 it can be concluded that RX1 and RX3 are
best described by a normal distribution of the Rician factor K, whereas RX2
and RX4 favor the uniform distribution. It is important to note a large value
2 = 350 of the normal distribution used for RX 4. It suggests
of variance σK

that the uniform distribution could also provide a good fit. In other words, it
confirms the presence of a range of K values, at the same time demonstrating
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Table 4.1: Overview of distribution fit for various experimental scenarios
Scenario

Distribution
Rice
Nakagami
Weibull
Rayleigh
KP-Uniform
KP-Normal
Rice
Nakagami
Weibull
Rayleigh
KP-Uniform
KP-Normal

Reading (nLoS)

Reading (LoS)

KP-Binomial
Turning
KP-Normal Mixture

Casual Walking

RX
RX
RX
RX

1
2
3
4

KP-Normal
KP-Uniform
KP-Uniform
KP-Normal

Parameters
sRice = 1.1e−3, σRice = 8.8e−3
µ = 1.15, Ω = 0.16e−3
a = 12.6e−3, b = 2.10
σRay = 8.8e−3
Kmin = 0.01, Kmax = 0.01, PR = −70.1dBm
µK = 0.01, σK = 0, PR = 70.1dBm,
sRice = 44.8e−3, σRice = 17.4e−3
µ = 2.1, Ω = 2.62e−5
a = 0.054, b = 3.090
σRay = 36.2e−3
Kmin = 3.28, Kmax = 3.28, PR = −52.6dBm
µK = 3.28, σK = 0, PR = −52.6dBm
K1 = 3.2, PR1 = −59.9dBm
K2 = 28.7, PR2 = −45.2dBm
µK1 = 3.2, σK1 = 0.5, PR1 = −59.9dBm
µK2 = 28.7, σK2 = 3, PR2 = −45.2dBm
2 = 178
µK ≈ 0, σK
Kmin = 0, Kmax = 30
Kmin = 0, Kmax = 27
2 = 350
µK = 2.2, σK

KS
0.039
0.027
0.028
0.039
0.038
0.039
0.068
0.084
0.075
0.207
0.069
0.068

ρpdf
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.95
0.93
0.94
0.80
0.95
0.95

0.09

0.96

0.10

0.98

0.043
0.044
0.041
0.069

0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99

that not all of them are equally likely. High values of ρpdf > 0.99 indicate
that the proposed model can successfully capture the essence of the casual
walking. However, one might wonder how to correctly choose Kmin and Kmax
or µK and σK for the experiment of interest. As for the turning experiment
of section 4.1.5, it would be defined by the expected motion dynamics, layout
of the indoor environment, subject’s body type and other factors. To some
extent these factors are captured by Fig. 4.5 that yields not just a linear
relationship, but also suggests a range of Rician factors typical for the current
environment. Thus, from the figure it is clear that observing values of K > 30
is unlikely.
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Selection Combining
Using the same data we compare how the correlation of the Rician factor between two RX antennas affects the correlation of their instantaneous power.
(4.12) and (4.13) report instantaneous power correlation matrix and average
power (after LPF) correlation matrix respectively for the walking experiment.
It is important to note that strong negative correlation of −0.41 occurs naturally between RXs 1 and 2 located on opposite side of the room. This is due to
the effect of body shadowing, path loss, room’s geometry and layout. Majority
of past work only considered positive correlation as the concept is well understood. However, as negative correlation may naturally occur, investigating its
effect is equally essential. It is reasonable to anticipate that negative correlation will benefit the communication system since it is very likely to allow one
antenna to perform much better than the other for a given moment of time.
As can be predicted, strong positive correlation of 0.56 is observed for RXs 2
and 4.



−0.41 −0.14 −0.41




−0.41

1
0.15
0.56


Ω0 = 



1
0.07 
−0.14 0.15


−0.41 0.56
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1
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Figure 4.7: Rician factor correlation vs channel power correlation

In Fig. 4.7, the correlation of instantaneous power is plotted against the
correlation of K or average power. Every experimental data point represents a
correlation of a RX pair, namely 1-2, 1-3, 2-3, 2-4, 3-4 before and after applyting LPF. In other words, Fig. 4.7 visualizes (4.12) and (4.13). Due to rapidly
changing small scale fading it is expected that instantaneous power would be
less correlated than average power. Both simulation and experiment are in
agreement and exhibit clear linear trends. The linear relationship validates
our initial assumption that for a WBAN operating in an indoor environment
average received power (large scale fading) and instantaneous received power
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(small-scale fading) are determined jointly.
Fig. 4.8 shows the relative gain for different levels of outage probability
when SC is applied to RX antenna pairs mentioned in the previous paragraph.
Combiner output for RXs 3 and 4 is chosen as a reference since ρ034 is close to
zero. From the figure, it follows that as the correlation between RXs increases,
the relative SC gain decreases. Note that the gain due to negative correlation
can go higher than 2.5 dB for outage level Pout = 2% when compared to SC
applied to uncorrelated RXs. This behavior can be explained by the fact that
when one RX experiences weak reception, the other one is very likely to have
a strong signal. For positive correlation no relative gain is observed since
positively correlated RXs suffer from diversity loss.
In Fig. 4.9 relative gain for different outage probabilities is reported when
the channel is modeled according to KP-Uniform([0 Kmax ]), where two cases
Kmax = 20 and Kmax = 50 are considered. As the latter uses wider range of
K values, relative gain for it is expected to be higher. Thus, from the figure
it follows that for ρij = −1 and Pout = 10%, the difference is more than two
times (2.9 dB vs 8.25 dB). It is important to note that both simulation and
experiment exhibit similar trends and suggest that negative correlation makes
communication more reliable with Gij > 0. When comparing Fig. 4.8 and
Fig. 4.9, it also follows that the value of Kmax = 20 describes the experiment
better. This is in agreement with Fig. 4.5 where the majority of Rician factors
are below 20. Although discrepancies between the proposed model and the
experiment are present, one should remember that the uniform distribution of
K along with the ρKP = 1 are very strong assumptions. As was previously
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Figure 4.8: Relative SC gain for different outage levels (experiment)

shown in Fig. 4.6d, the actual distribution of K may be different and also
not identical for different sensors. Moreover, the actual correlation ρKP as
suggested by Fig. 4.5 is lower than 1.

4.1.7

Conclusion

In this section we proposed a new model for the off-body channels in WBAN.
Compared to traditional channel models which follow the classical approach
with three independent components: path loss, large scale fading, and small
scale fading, we hypothesized that Rician multipath fading and variation of
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Figure 4.9: Relative SC gain for different outage levels (simulation)

average received power PR are linked and fully described by a Rician factor
K. In addition, K was treated as a random variable having PDF matching
the expected motion dynamics of a human body. The model was shown to be
scalable to multi-antenna communication by considering a vector of Ks with
some joint distribution and possible correlation between the antennas.
We conducted multiple experiments where we showed that Rician factor
K is connected to both TX-RX distance and orientation of a human body.
Consequently, K was found to be highly correlated with PR which validated
our underlying assumption. A different set of experiments demonstrated that
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the proposed model inherently accounts for different types of body motion and
characterizes the PDF of the received signal magnitude for various WBAN
scenarios, such as reading at desk, casual walking, turning at one place, with
high accuracy. On top of that, we showed that the model can predict the
performance of correlated selection combining reception.
We believe that direct connection of the proposed model to the anticipated
body motion, its simplicity along with demonstrated practical relevance makes
it a convenient and powerful tool in WBAN research.

4.2
4.2.1

Negatively Correlated Eavesdropper
Introduction

Common solution to alleviate the computational burden on WBAN sensors
is employment of Wireless Physical Layer Security algorithm to establish a
secret key. However, as WPLS takes advantage of the broadcast nature of
the wireless transmission, it is prone to active attacks [110] as well as passive
eavesdropping [38]. Being more realistic in practical applications, we focus on
the latter.
It is known that for the passive eavesdropper to gain intelligence on legitimate communication, she needs to be within a few wavelengths away from
one of the participants. Otherwise, her channel is completely independent and
bares no useful information. In mathematical terms it can be expressed using
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Mutual Information (MI):

I(A, B|Z) = I(A, B)

(4.14)

where left hand side is a conditional mutual information. The validity of this
assumption was previously examined in [38, 49, 50]. In [38] many experiments
identified that in typical propagation conditions of an office space or an outdoor environment, there are many cases where eavesdropper’s channel exhibits
strong correlation contrary to the aforementioned assumption. It was shown
that this correlation is proportional to the distance between the eavesdropper
and a legitimate participant. Although, the same authors observed strong
negative correlation in some experiments, there were no attempts to explain
or exploit it. In [49], researches proposed an attack that exploits channel
correlation. Through analysis and experimental validation, they showed that
it is possible for the eavesdropper to extract a close replica of the legitimate
channel. Various correlation channel models were considered in [50] in order to identify key physical factors influencing the correlation. Based on this
information, a generic model was developed and used to assess the security
strength.
Contrary to past work, in this section we challenge the assumption given
by (4.14) from WBAN perspective. We demonstrate that unique propagation conditions caused by the presence of a human body can be exploited
by the eavesdropper to gain information about the legitimate channel. More
importantly, we quantify the effect of the negatively correlated eavesdropper
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Figure 4.10: Experimental site layout with sensor placement

by employing a practical secret key extraction algorithm and reporting how
legitimate and attacker’s keys are related.

4.2.2

Experimental Setup and Key Extraction

Experimental Setup
The hardware platform used in this study is described in section 2.3. We
conduct an experiment where the AP is placed on the subject’s torso and
other four sensors are distributed around the room at locations depicted in
Fig. 4.10 by numbered circles. The participating subject is a 92 kg weight
and 177 cm tall male. All devices are ≈150cm above the room floor. In the
considered setup, the AP and sensor 2 are legitimate participants (Alice and
Bob), while others are eavesdroppers. During the experiment, the subject
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walks around the room in a random fashion at a speed of ≈1 m/s. Around
10,000 RSSI probes are extracted for every sensor. After collection, all data
are taken offline for analysis. During this stage, RSSI streams are time aligned
and upsampled to a 1 ms resolution.

Legitimate Key Extraction
In general, to extract a shared secret through the wireless channel, legitimate
participants Alice and Bob follow four main steps: Channel probing; Quantization; Reconciliation; Privacy amplification. However, as was shown in [8],
Reconciliation and Privacy amplification can be computationally overwhelming for miniature body-worn sensors. Thus, in a WBAN context, it is desirable
to extract the operating key right after Quantization. In order for Alice and
Bob to agree on the same key with high probability without the last two steps,
additional preprocessing steps are needed before channel probes go into Quantization. Note that preprocessing can also be used in addition to Reconciliation
and Privacy amplification. All past work used some sort of a Low Pass Filter
(LPF) to achieve the goal. The authors of [8, 54, 80] employed Savitzky-Golay
filter while [61] utilized cubic Farrow filter based interpolation. Weighted sliding window smoothing was used in [111]. For generality, in this section we
take advantage of a standard moving average filter as the LPF. Our channel
probes consist of Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) samples as they
became an integral part of many physical layer communication protocols and
are is widely accessible. Our approach makes use of the existing quantizer
presented in [53].
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Based on the above, the secret key extraction process is as follows:
1. Channel probing: Alice and Bob sample the channel at the fastest
rate supported by the system.
2. Preprocessing: Channel samples in the form of RSSI are downsampled to the sampling rate of fs to avoid correlation between successive
probes. Then moving average filter of length LM A is applied to improve
agreement between Alice and Bob.
3. Quantization: In the available RSSI stream Alice and Bob consider
a block of LBS consecutive samples and independently calculate q + =
µ + ασ and q − = µ − ασ, where µ and σ are the mean and the standard
deviation of the block, respectively. Then Alice and Bob drop the RSSI
samples that fall between q + and q − and exchange the indices of the
remaining RSSIs. For all indices that both Alice and Bob keep, they
extract a 1 if RSSI sample is above q + and a 0 if it is below q − .
Here the sampling rate fs , block size LBS , and α are system design parameters.
Since this section is focused on security aspects, we assume ideal reciprocity
for Alice and Bob except for the additive white gaussian noise N (0, 1) on both
sides.

4.2.3

Negative Correlation Attack

For the adversary model, we assume that Eve can overhear all information
exchange between Alice and Bob. She also knows the key extraction algorithm
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outlined in section 4.2.2 along with the values of its parameters. For the Eve’s
channel to be uncorrelated, we also assume that she is not closer than a few
multiples of the wavelength from Alice or Bob. Eve does not interfere with
the legitimate key extraction process in any way, e.g. no jamming, message
modification or disruption are feasible. To summarize, we deal with a passive
eavesdropper and assume an authenticated channel between Alice and Bob.
As shown in Fig. 4.10, we consider three different eavesdroppers. Eve 4
is located 30cm away from the legitimate sensor 2 and is meant to provide a
reference for an eavesdropper whose channel is strongly correlated. Eve 3 is
≈4.5 meters away from sensor 2 and located on the perpendicular wall. Eve
1 is the farthest from the legitimate party. It is positioned on the opposite
wall being ≈8.84 meters apart from sensor 2. As was shown in [33], Eve 1 is
expected to have a negatively correlated channel.
In order to discover the legitimate secret key, Eve follows a simple set of
rules. She first intercepts channel samples and a set of indices Alice and Bob
will use for bit extraction in the current block. Then she calculates the mean
of her block and for every sample in the set that is greater or smaller than
the mean, a 1 or a 0 is generated, respectively. After that, if Eve is expected
to have a negative correlation (such as Eve 1), generated bits are flipped.
Otherwise, no other actions are required (applies for Eve 3 and Eve 4).

4.2.4

Security Analysis

In the beginning of our investigation we analyze the behavior of our experimental data under different configurations of moving average. Length of the
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moving average filter ranges from 1 to 1000 ms. We aim to confirm the presence of a negatively correlated eavesdropper and quantify the amount of information being leaked or shared with the attacker. We employ two metrics:
correlation and Mutual Information (MI). The correlation coefficient of RSSI
streams between Eve and one of the legitimate participants (Alice) is defined
as:
N

ρ(Ri , RA ) =

1 X
N −1
i=1



Ri − µRi
σRi



RA − µRA
σ RA


(4.15)

where Ri and RA denote RSSI samples of the ith eavesdropper and Alice, respectively. µ and σ are the corresponding mean and standard deviation, while
N is the number of samples. We also consider MI to characterize the threat
in more generic terms. MI between Eve and Alice can be found according to:

I(Ri , RA ) =

X
ri ,rA

Pri ,rA log

PRi RA (ri , rA )
PRi (ri )PRA (rA )

(4.16)

where PRi ,PRA and PRi RA are the marginal and joint probability distribution
of Eve’s and Alice’s RSSI, respectively. We take advantage of the Kraskov
Stoegbauer Grassberger (KSG) estimator with local nonuniformity correction
reported in [42] to evaluate MI.
After generic investigation, we directly analyze the effect of smoothing
(moving average) on security of a key generation process. More specifically,
we use a Key Mismatch Ratio (KMR) as the main metric to understand how
agreement between Alice and Bob effects Eve’s ability to acquire the secret
key. Formally, KMR is defined as the ratio between the number of different
bits in the secret keys and the total number of key bits generated by Alice

CHAPTER 4. WBAN WITH DYNAMIC USER BEHAVIOR

91

4.5

0.8

4
0.6

3

0.4

2.5

0.2

2
0
Eve1 (MI)
Eve3 (MI)
Eve4 (MI)
Eve1 (correlation)
Eve3 (correlation)
Eve4 (correlation)

1.5
1
0.5

correlation coefficient

Mutual information (bits)

3.5

-0.2

-0.4

0
0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

length of moving average (msec)

Figure 4.11: Effect of moving average on correlation and mutual information

and Bob or by Alice and Eve. In this part, system design parameters are the
following: sampling frequency after downsampling fs = 1 seconds, block size
LBS = 10 samples, and α = 0.1. These values are consistent with past work
reported in [8].
Lastly, we attempt to show the effect of quantizer parameters namely block
size LBS and α on KMR for a fixed length of 5 samples of the moving average
filter. In this study, LBS varies from 4 to 500 samples with an increment of
10, whereas α takes on 10 values in between 0.01 and 0.5.
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4.2.5

Results and Discussion

Results of the generic effect of signal smoothing on security properties are
demonstrated in Fig. 4.11. The left y axis presents MI, while the right y
axis presents correlation coefficient between Alice and attackers. As expected,
without moving average, Eve 4 exhibits strong positive correlation of 0.51 and
Eve 1 shows a noticeable negative correlation of -0.28. Eve 3 channel indicates
correlation close to 0. At the same time, MI for all eavesdroppers is approximately same and does not exceed 0.3 bits. As the length of moving average
increases, correlation becomes more apparent. After 1000 ms it reaches 0.83
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and -0.5 for Eve 4 and Eve 1, respectively. Example of RSSI streams for all
participants after a 1 second moving average is presented in Fig. 4.12. From
this figure, negative and positive correlation of Eve1 and Eve 4 with Alice are
clear, whereas Eve 3 appears independent of Alice. Even though correlation
of Eve 3 is almost unaffected by moving average, from the MI perspective it is
obvious that she shares some information with Alice. Nevertheless, information leakage is much more apparent for Eve 4 and Eve 1 resulting in ≈ 4.31
and ≈ 3.58 bits, respectively. Note the fact that Eve 1 poses significantly
higher threat than Eve 3 despite being almost 2 times farther (4.5 m vs 8.83
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m) from Alice. Also, Eve 1 shares with Alice only 17% less information being
on the opposite side of the room, compared to Eve 4 who is very close to Alice.
This is primarily due to the strategic position of Eve 1 that allowed for body
shadowing and lead to negative correlation.
Next set of results is presented in Fig. 4.13. Here the left y axis is the
KMR between Alice an Bob and the right y axis is the KMR between Alice
and Eve. x axis is the length of the moving average filter where 1 sample
is equivalent to 1 second. It is clear that smoothing is extremely helpful in
reducing disagreement between legitimate participants. The 4% KMR drops
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to %1.3 over the considered filter configurations. However, this improvement
comes at the cost of compromised security. It is apparent that KMR is also
decreasing for all eavesdroppers. Eve 4 experiences the most drastic change
with KMR reducing almost by a factor of two, from 0.32 to 0.17. Eve 1 exhibits
a drop from 0.39 to 0.27. KMR reduction is less evident for Eve 3: from 0.45
to 0.37 and saturates beyond 6 samples. Note that maximum uncertainty is
achieved for KMR=0.5 that is equivalent to guessing. Thus, after filtering
Eve 1 has a confidence of 73% (compare to 50%) that every bit she extracts
is correct.
Finally, Fig. 4.14 reflects operation of the chosen quantizer. Every point
in the scatter plot is a KMR for a given block size LBS and α. We can
observe that quantizer parameters must be thoughtfully selected as KMR for
Eve 1 and KMR for Eve 4 exhibit clear linear relationship with KMR between
Alice and Bob. In other words, it means that reducing legitimate KMR will
tend to decrease KMR for Eve as well. This fact is mainly attributed to the
quantizer’s block size. As LBS gets longer, it captures slow variations that
tend to be the main source of correlation. At the same time, Eve 3 does not
seem to be notably affected by the quantizer, suggesting that she may not pose
a significant threat for legitimate communication. Overall, Fig. 4.14 shows
that Eve 1 and Eve 4 constitute the main source of security vulnerability
confirming previous results reported in this section.
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Conclusion

In this section, we considered a WBAN operated indoors in presence of an
eavesdropper strategically positioned in the room to achieve a negatively correlated channel. Through the experimental study, a qualitative analysis of
correlation and mutual information demonstrated that the commonly used
signal smoothing technique to improve key agreement between legitimate participants, leads to significant amount of information shared with the negatively
correlated attacker. Interestingly, this attacker may get a better insight into
the legitimate channel being twice farther from the authorized parties compared to an eavesdropper who does not experience negative correlation. We
then quantified and validated the power of the negative correlation attack
on the practical key extraction algorithm. We showed that due to the moving average filter, key mismatch rate (KMR) reached 0.27 implying that the
attacker’s confidence raised from 50% to 73% in the considered experiment.
Importantly, we also revealed that quantizer parameters need to be selected
carefully as KMR reduction for Alice-Bob will tend to lower KMR for Eve.

Chapter 5

Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation we considered applications of Wireless Physical Layer Security (WPLS) to communications in Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs).
In particular, we extended a celebrated Compressed Sensing technique to include security and showed that the proposed framework can potentially save
a significant amount of memory and computational resources by securing the
analog signal while sampling it at subNyquist rate. Apart from that, we found
that WPLS Key Generation Rate (KGR) can be improved by manipulating
a switching threshold when WBAN access point employs Switch-And-Stay
Combining (SSC). More importantly, it was revealed that there is a tradeoff between KGR and output Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR). In addition, we
demonstrated that when a WBAN user exhibits dynamic behavior, traditional models that describe an off-body channel are insufficient. We proposed
an alternative off-body channel model where small and large scale fading are
connected through a Rician factor K and K is treated as a random variable
97
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whose distribution is directly associated with physical dynamics of the experiment. Such consideration allowed for more accurate modeling of body motion
in indoor WBAN off-body channel, including the phenomena of negatively
correlated channels. In the end, we showed that body motion and body shadowing cause the wireless channel in WBAN to be correlated. Specifically, it was
demonstrated that by carefully selecting its location, eavesdropper can achieve
a strong negative correlation that results in notable information leakage and
reduction of the secret key strength for a practical WPLS key extraction algorithm.
We believe that considered aspects of WBAN communication contribute to
the body of knowledge and will be of interest to researchers and professionals
in the field. In the future, we plan to extend the current work and investigate
the ways in which negative correlation can be exploited in the communication
between legitimate correspondents. For example, this phenomenon can potentially be used for shared key extraction between multiple devices located on
the body. Another interesting research direction would be to generalize the
proposed indoor off-body channel model to the indoor communication where
line of sight is not present and also to the various outdoor settings. Note
that the contributions of dynamic channel model and securing while sampling
extend beyond WBANs and promote research in other fields.

Bibliography
[1] IEEE standard for local and metropolitan area networks - part 15.6:
Wireless body area networks. IEEE Std 802.15.6-2012, pages 1–271,
Feb 2012.
[2] The growing crisis of chronic disease in the united states. Online at
https://www.fightchronicdisease.org, 2017.
[3] Adnan A Abu-Dayya and Norman C Beaulieu. Analysis of switched
diversity systems on generalized-fading channels. IEEE Transactions on
Communications, 42(11):2959–2966, 1994.
[4] Paul S Addison. Wavelet transforms and the ecg: a review. Physiological
measurement, 26(5):R155, 2005.
[5] Rudolf Ahlswede and Imre Csiszár. Common randomness in information
theory and cryptography. part i: secret sharing. IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, 39(4), 1993.
[6] Syed Taha Ali, Vijay Sivaraman, and Diethelm Ostry. Secret key generation rate vs. reconciliation cost using wireless channel characteristics in
body area networks. In 2010 IEEE/IFIP International Conference on
Embedded and Ubiquitous Computing, pages 644–650. IEEE, 2010.
[7] Syed Taha Ali, Vijay Sivaraman, and Diethelm Ostry. Zero reconciliation secret key generation for body-worn health monitoring devices.
In Proceedings of the fifth ACM conference on Security and Privacy in
Wireless and Mobile Networks, pages 39–50. ACM, 2012.
[8] Syed Taha Ali, Vijay Sivaraman, and Diethelm Ostry. Eliminating reconciliation cost in secret key generation for body-worn health monitoring
devices. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 13(12):2763–2776,
2014.
99

BIBLIOGRAPHY

100

[9] Slawomir J Ambroziak, Luis M Correia, Ryszard J Katulski, Michal
Mackowiak, Carla Oliveira, Jaroslaw Sadowski, and Kenan Turbic. An
off-body channel model for body area networks in indoor environments.
IEEE Transactions on Antennas and Propagation, 64(9):4022–4035,
2016.
[10] Gerard Anderson and Jane Horvath. The growing burden of chronic
disease in america. Public health reports, 119(3):263–270, 2004.
[11] Mirza Mansoor Baig, Hamid Gholamhosseini, and Martin J Connolly.
A comprehensive survey of wearable and wireless ecg monitoring systems for older adults. Medical & biological engineering & computing,
51(5):485–495, 2013.
[12] Mohammadreza Balouchestani, Kaamran Raahemifar, and Sridhar Krishnan. Low power wireless body area networks with compressed sensing
theory. In Circuits and Systems (MWSCAS), 2012 IEEE 55th International Midwest Symposium on, pages 916–919. IEEE, 2012.
[13] Ayan Banerjee, K Venkatasubramanian, and Sandeep KS Gupta. Challenges of implementing cyber-physical security solutions in body area
networks. In Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Body
Area Networks, page 18. ICST (Institute for Computer Sciences, SocialInformatics and , 2009.
[14] M Blanco and K Zdunek. Performance and optimization of switched
diversity systems for the detection of signals with rayleigh fading. IEEE
Transactions on Communications, 27(12):1887–1895, 1979.
[15] Jrg Buchholz. Matlab implementation of the advanced encryption standard @ONLINE, December 2001.
[16] Jinsung Byun, Boungju Jeon, Junyoung Noh, Youngil Kim, and Sehyun
Park. An intelligent self-adjusting sensor for smart home services based
on zigbee communications. IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, 58(3):794–802, 2012.
[17] E. J. Candes, J. Romberg, and T. Tao. Robust uncertainty principles:
Exact signal reconstruction from highly incomplete frequency information. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor., 52(2):489–509, February 2006.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

101

[18] E. J. Candes and T. Tao. Near-optimal signal recovery from random
projections: Universal encoding strategies? IEEE Trans. Inf. Theor.,
52(12):5406–5425, December 2006.
[19] Huasong Cao, Victor Leung, Cupid Chow, and Henry Chan. Enabling
technologies for wireless body area networks: A survey and outlook.
IEEE Communications Magazine, 47(12):84–93, 2009.
[20] Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). Online at
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/hipaa/, 1996.
[21] Chinmay Chakraborty, Bharat Gupta, and Soumya K Ghosh. A review on telemedicine-based wban framework for patient monitoring.
Telemedicine and e-Health, 19(8):619–626, 2013.
[22] Sriram Cherukuri, Krishna K Venkatasubramanian, and Sandeep KS
Gupta. Biosec: A biometric based approach for securing communication
in wireless networks of biosensors implanted in the human body. In
2003 International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops, 2003.
Proceedings., pages 432–439. IEEE, 2003.
[23] Hsueh-Ting Chu, Chir-Chang Huang, Zhi-Hui Lian, and Jeffrey JP Tsai.
A ubiquitous warning system for asthma-inducement. In IEEE International Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, and Trustworthy
Computing (SUTC’06), volume 2, pages 186–191. IEEE, 2006.
[24] Don Coppersmith. The data encryption standard (des) and its strength
against attacks. IBM journal of research and development, 38(3):243–
250, 1994.
[25] Simon L Cotton. Characteristics of shadowed fading in off-body communications channels at 2.45 ghz. In General Assembly and Scientific
Symposium (URSI GASS), 2014 XXXIth URSI, pages 1–4. IEEE, 2014.
[26] Simon L Cotton. A statistical model for shadowed body-centric communications channels: Theory and validation. IEEE Transactions on
Antennas and Propagation, 62(3):1416–1424, 2014.
[27] Simon L Cotton and William G Scanlon. Spatial diversity and correlation for off-body communications in indoor environments at 868 mhz. In

BIBLIOGRAPHY

102

Vehicular Technology Conference, 2007. VTC2007-Spring. IEEE 65th,
pages 372–376. IEEE, 2007.
[28] Simon L Cotton and William G Scanlon. Measurements, modeling and
simulation of the off-body radio channel for the implementation of bodyworn antenna diversity at 868 mhz. IEEE transactions on antennas and
propagation, 57(12):3951–3961, 2009.
[29] SL Cotton, A McKernan, AJ Ali, and WG Scanlon. An experimental
study on the impact of human body shadowing in off-body communications channels at 2.45 ghz. In Antennas and Propagation (EUCAP),
Proceedings of the 5th European Conference on, pages 3133–3137. IEEE,
2011.
[30] Thomas M Cover and Joy A Thomas. Elements of information theory.
John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[31] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen. The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced
Encryption Standard. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer,
2002.
[32] Ingrid Daubechies et al. Ten lectures on wavelets, volume 61. SIAM,
1992.
[33] R. Dautov and G. Tsouri. On the negatively correlated eavesdropper in
indoor wireless body area networks. In 2019 16th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications Networking Conference (CCNC), pages 1–2, Jan
2019.
[34] Ruslan Dautov and Gill R Tsouri. Establishing secure measurement
matrix for compressed sensing using wireless physical layer security. In
Computing, Networking and Communications (ICNC), 2013 International Conference on, pages 354–358. IEEE, 2013.
[35] W. Diffie and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theor., 22(6):644–654, September 2006.
[36] David L. Donoho. Compressed sensing. IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory,
52:1289–1306, 2006.
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